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ARTICLES
BRIBERY AS A "REAL" DEFENSE
AGAINST A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
LOIS REGENT DRISCOLL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bribery' is an ancient evil. Egypt's legal system, which goes back
"beyond 4000 B.C.,"' has left relics of specific pronouncements by King
Thutmose III dated about 1500 B.C.' condemning partiality on the part
of a judge.' Egyptian King Harmhab's Edict for Judges,5 written about
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baruch College, The City University of New
York; member, New York and Connecticut Bars.
1. Bribery is an unusually complex molecule and involves careful and exten-
sive separate study. See generally, E.A. Ross, SIN AND SOCIETY (1907); W.M. REISMAN,
FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES AND REFORMS (1979) containing a bibliography of over
180 sources including United Nations and Congressional papers and law review articles;
N.H. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS, and R. EELLS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS:
A STUDY OF CORPORATE POLITICAL PAYMENTS ABROAD (1977); R.L. SMITH, THE TARNISHED
BADGE (1965); THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION (1972); D. BOULTON,
THE GREASE MACHINE: THE INSIDE STORY OF LOCKHEED'S DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (1978); R.W.
GREENE, THE STING MAN: INSIDE ABSCAM (1981); J. LEVY-CAEN, DE LA CORRUPTION DES
EMPLOYES: EN DROIT FRANCAIS ET EN DROIT ANGLAIS (1934); L.R. DRISCOLL, The Illegality
of Bribery: Its Roots, Essence, and Universality, CAPITAL U.L. REV. (to be published
February 1985).
2. J. WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEM 11 (Library Ed.
(1936).
3. Id. at 16.
4. "It is an abomination of the god to show partiality. This is the teaching:
thou shalt act alike to all, shalt regard him who is known to thee like him who is
unknown to thee, and him who is near to thee like him who is far . . ." id. at 16-17,
quoting from instructions recorded on the tomb of chief judge Rekhmire purporting
to have been pronounced by King Thutmose III, citing the translation from J.H.
BREASTED, 2 ANCIENT RECORDS OF EGYPT S 666-670 (1907), at 52, n.c., 53.
5. King Harmhab's Edict, set forth by Wigmore, supra note 2, at 15-16, in
part inveighs: "I have sailed and traveled throughout the entire land. I have sought
out two judges perfect in speech, excellent in character, skilled in penetrating the
innermost thoughts of men, and acquainted with the procedure of the palace and the
laws of the court ... I have said to them, 'You shall not take money from one party
and decide without hearing the other; for how could you sit as judges upon other
men's deeds when one among you is himself committing an offense against justice?
The penalty for such an offense shall be death.' And I the king have decreed this,
that the laws of Egypt be bettered, and that suitors may not be oppressed. For I
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1300 B.C.,' on penalty of death, even more expressly and absolutely
prohibits a jurist from taking money from a party to a lawsuit.'
Almost as old as bribery itself is the law of commercial paper.
The first known negotiable instrument dates back to about 2100 B.C.,
around the time of the reign of King Hammurabi'
The laws pertaining to bribery and commercial paper are not
only ancient, but each is an integral part of our present everyday
lives. On a single average business day recently in the United States,
it is reported that over 100 million checks valued at over $50 billion
were written.' As for the prevalence of bribery today, the post-
Watergate scandals involving Lockheed Aircraft's countless millions
of dollars in payment abroad,"0 and the incredible videotaped
"Abscam"'' operations at home, depict bribery as quotidian today as
garden weeds, the common cold and TV soap operas.
1. Bribery Laws
Although they apparently have very little deterrent effect, we
have anti-bribery laws aplenty 2 on the books. The founding fathers
Id. (citing at 52, n.b., 53, the translation in BREASTED, supra note 4, Vol. 3 S 23.)
6. Id. at 18. Harmhab is said to have married the aunt-in-law of King
Tutankhamen. Id.
7. See supra note 5.
8. The bearer note reads, "5 shekels of silver, at the usual rate of interest,
loaned by the Temple of Shamash and by I. Company, to Idin and his wife, are payable
with interest on sight of the payors at the market-place to the bearer of this instru-
ment." WIGMORE, supra note 2 at 69 (citing the German translation in M. SCHORR,
URKUNDEN DES ALTABABYLONISCHE ZIVIL-UND PROZESSRECHTS, (No. 58) at 88 (1913). Id. at
95, n.e.
9. REILING, THOMPSON, BRADY and MACCHIAROLA, BUSINESS LAW TEXT AND
CASES 393 (1981).
10. BOULTON, supra note 1 at xiv. Senator Church, investigating Lockheed Air-
craft, is quoted as stating, "The bribes and the payoffs associated with doing business
abroad represent a pattern of crookedness that would make, in terms of its scope
and magnitude, crookedness in politics look like a Sunday school picnic by comparison."
Id. at 266.
11. "Abscam" was short for Abdul scam and involved a two-year investiga-
tion operated through a dummy corporation on Long Island called Abdul Enterprises,
Ltd. which resulted in bribery indictments of, among others, Philadelphia Congressman
Michael J. Myers; Representative Raymond F. Lederer (D-Pa.), a member of the House
Ways and Means Committee; Representative John W. Jenrette, Jr. (D-S.C.), a member
of the House Appropriations Committee; Representative Richard Kelly (R-Fla.);
Representative Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-N.J.), Chairman of the House Administration
Committee and the subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations; and Representative
John M. Murphy (D-N.Y.). GREENE, supra note 1, at 5-6.
12. "There is law aplenty on the books," but the real question is the extent
of "commitment to consistent and vigorous enforcement, which is, of course, the key
to the enforcement of antibribery laws and indeed to any meaningful response to white-
collar crime." REISMAN, supra note 1 at 160.
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so deplored bribery that, except for treason, it is the only crime
specified in the Constitution as an impeachable offense."3 Bribing
another's employee to influence him to perform his duties improperly
("commercial bribery"") is a common law offense,"6 is prohibited by
specific criminal statutes in at least half our states" and, in the
rest, may constitute wrongful conduct under the common law, or under
one or a combination of those states' various general criminal
13. U.S. CONST., art. II, S 4 provides for impeachment of the president, vice-
president, and all civil officers for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misde-
meanors." As to this provision, Prof. Reisman says, "It should be no surprise that
the first modern experiment in popular government fixed so sharply on bribery as
a fundamental violation of the trust the people were putting in an elected leader.
In this constellation of expectations, bribery is a form of treason." Id. at 3-4.
14. Commercial bribery has been defined as the "bribing of another's employees
for the purpose of inducing the employees to act in their employment in some way
favorable to the briber's interest." D.B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES
700 (1973). It has also been described as "an offense of bribing an employee, servant,
or agent, with the intent to influence him in his relation to his employer, master or
principal." 1 A.L.R. 3d 1350, 1352-53 (1965). 12 AM. JUR. 2d 759 (1964) defines it as "the
act of giving or receiving a gift for the purpose of influencing any agent to improperly
discharge a duty entrusted to him by a private individual or corporation." The history
of various statues prohibiting commercial bribery is described in Perrin v. United States
444 U.S. 37 (1979). "Commercial bribery was generally treated under the rubric of
the law of 'master and servant' since it involved deceit of the employer practiced jointly
by the external briber and the employee as well as contractual violations by the
employee. But the Federal Trade Commission viewed commercial bribery as an unfair
trade practice." REISMAN, supra note 1 at 176, n.3. See also United States v. Pomponio,
511 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1975).
15. "The common law offense of bribery has been defined as follows: 'whenever
a person is bound by law to act without any view to his own private emolument,
and another by a corrupt contract engages such person on condition of the payment
or promise of money or other lucrative consideration to act in a manner which he
shall prescribe, both parties are by such contract guilty of bribery' (14 Halsbury's
Laws (3rd Ed.) 213; 2 Douglas Election Cases 400)." I WORDS AND PHRASES, Bribery 185
(2d ed. 1969).
16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-2605 (Supp. 1983-84); ARIZ. GEN. CORP.
LAW S 10-136 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-5-401 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. SS 53a-160,
53a-161; HAWAII REV. STAT. S 708-880; ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 28 S 29A-1-20A-3; KAN. STAT.
ANN. S 21-4405; Ky. REV. STAT. SS 518.030; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:73; MASS. GEN. LAWS,
Ch. 271 S 39; MICH. STAT. ANN. S 750-150; Mo. REV. STAT., title 38 S 570.150; NEB. REV.
STAT. S 28-710; NEv. REV. STAT. S 613.110, 613.120; N. H. REV. STAT. S 638.7; N.J. STAT.
ANN. SS 2C:21-10 through 2C:21-15; 2C:41-1 through 2C:41-6.2 (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW SS
180.00- 180.08; N.C. GES. STAT. S 14.353; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. title 18 S 4108; R.I. GEN.
LAWS SS 11-7-3-11-7-5; S.C. CODE S 16-17-540; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. S 32.43 (1974 and
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-508 (1978); VA. CODE S 18.2-444 (1982); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. SS 49.44.060, 49.44.070 (1962); WIS. STAT. S 134.05. Commercial bribery may
also violate other criminal statutes in these states, and their common law; further-
more, in other states, it may violate the common law and various of their other criminal
statutes. See infra note 17.
Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Hampshire, New York and Texas provide for
felony violations under certain circumstances. In other states, commercial bribery viola-
tions constitute misdemeanors.
1985]
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statutes. 7 Federal statutes providing a second layer of enforcement
supplementing state authority to prosecute commercial bribery have
recently proliferated. 8
The earliest commercial bribery 9 statutes passed in the United
States were enacted just after the turn of the century.' They represented
a legislative response to the then alarming spread of commercial bribery
and its viciousness, dishonesty, and "demoralizing tendencies."" New
York's first commercial bribery statute, passed in 1905,22 was expanded
17. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE SS 484, 504, 506, 508, 639 and 639a; IDAHO CODE
ANN. S 18-2402; MONT. CRIM. CODE SS 94-2306-2309; N.M. CRIM. CODE S 30-16-6 (general
criminal fraud statute); OHIO REV. CODE SS 2913.02, 2921.13, 2913.43(A), 2921.21(A),
2923.03, 2921.22(A), 2905.12(C), 2905.11; OR. REV. STAT. S 165.080 (falsifying business
records); OKLA. REV. STAT. 21 S 421 (conspiracy), 21 S 1640; Wyo. REV. STAT. S 6-7-315.
18. See Perrin, supra note 14; the Federal Trade Commisison Act, as amend-
ed, 15 U.S.C. S 45(a)(1)(2) (1982); the Mail Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1314 (1982); the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 13 (1982); the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1952 (1982);
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1951 (1982); the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. S 1962 (1982); the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. S 1059(2)
(1982); the Wire Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1343 (1982). There are also a large number
of federal statutes prohibiting not only such activities as bribing a Congressman (18
U.S.C. SS 204-205), a bank examiner (18 U.S.C. SS 212-213) or any other federal "public
official" (see 18 U.S.C. S 201(a)), but criminalizing "graft" and "conflict of interest" (18
U.S.C. SS 201-211) even as to former employees (id.) and partners of employees (id).
As to what commissions or fees are unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act, see 42
A.L.R. FED. 276 (1979). See also 55 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies SS 17, 162, 163, 800, 801 (1971);
as to cases dealing with federal kick-back statutes (41 U.S.C. SS 51-54 (1982)), see 17
L.Ed.2d 919 (1967). Any consignee or consignor of property delivered for interstate
transportation may not receive money or any valuable consideration as a rebate or
offset against regular charges for transportation. See S 1(3) of the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C.
S 41(3). A briber may be prosecuted for his activities in aiding a bank officer who
violates 18 U.S.C. SS 371 and 215. U.S. v. Michael, 456 F. Supp. 335 (D.C.N.J. 1978).
See also Continental Management, Inc. v. U.S., 527 F.2d 613 (Ct. Cl. 1975) as to civil
sanctions, and cases collected at 12 AM. JUR. 2d 750, Bribery, Under Federal Statutes
S 4 (1964).
As to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 U.S.C. SS 78a, 78m) see ARKIN,
DUDLEY, EISENSTEIN, RAKOFF, RE And SIFFERT, 5 BUSINESS CRIME: CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, ch. 18 and, generally, JACOBY, NEHEMKIS AND EELLS, supra
note 1; BOULTON, supra note 1.
19. See supra note 14.
20. See 1 A.L.R.3d 1353 (1978). As to the constitutionality of commercial bribery
statutes generally, see Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1350, 1357 (1978); State v. Brewer, 375 U.S.
9 (1963).
21. The words of Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 124 App. Div. 384, 387, 108
N.Y.S. 830, 832 (1st Dept. 1908).
22. New York's original commercial bribery statute was Sec. 384r of its then
Penal Code, which provided: "Corrupt influencing of agents, employees or servants.-
Whoever gives, offers or promises to an agent, employee or servant, any gift or gratuity
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 2
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in 190923 and became § 439 of the former New York Penal Law, which
thereafter was pared down" and cast into two separate statutes.25 A
further 1976 amendment bifurcated the crime into degrees, rendering
the first degree a class A misdemeanor." The most recent amendments
raised the penalties in all four commercial bribery statutes, so that com-
mercial bribing and bribe receiving in the first degree for the first time
in New York's history may constitute class E felonies."
whatever, without the knowledge and consent of the principal, employer or master
of such agent, employee or servant, with intent to influence his action in relation to
his principal's, employer's or master's business; or an agent, employee or servant who
without the knowledge and consent of his principal, employer or master, requests or
accepts a gift or gratuity or a promise to make a gift or to do an act beneficial to
himself, under an agreement or with an understanding that he shall act in any par-
ticular manner to his principal's, employee's or master's business; or an agent, employee
or servant, who, being authorized to procure materials, supplies or other articles either
by purchase or contract for his principal, employer or master, or to employ service
or labor for his principal, employer or master, receives directly or indirectly for himself
or for another, a commission, discount or bonus from the person who makes such sale
or contract, or furnishes such materials, supplies or other articles, or from a person
who renders such service or labor; and any person who gives or offers such an agent,
employee or servant such commission, discount or bonus shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than
five hundred dollars, or by such fine and by imprisonment for not more than one year."
1905 N.Y. Laws 225.
23. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 439 (1909), amended 1930 N.Y. Laws 882, c. 409. 1953 N.Y.
Laws 2455 c. 891, S 7 was from Penal Code 1881, S 384r, added 1905 N.Y. Laws 225
c. 136, S 1.
24. N.Y. PENAL LAW SS 180.00, Commercial bribing, and 180.05, Commercial
bribe receiving were passed by 1965 N.Y. Laws 2343 c. 1030. Id. at 326, 330. The
new statutes deleted the former S 439 penalties which rendered a seller who gave
a present to a purchasing agent and the agent both guilty of a crime even in the
absence of any intent or agreement that the agent's conduct would thereby be
influenced.
25. See supra note 24.
26. Effective September 1, 1976, pursuant to 1976 N.Y. Laws, c. 458, SS 1
and 5. Prior to that time, both commercial bribing and commercial bribe receiving
were class B misdemeanors not split into different degrees. See 1965 N.Y. Laws 2420,
c. 1030.
27. The most recent amendments were effective September 1, 1983, and were
passed by 1983 N.Y. Laws 2048, c. 577 S 1. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 180.08 entitled "Com-
mercial bribe receiving in the first degree" provides:
An employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of commercial bribe receiving
in the first degree when, without the consent of his employer or prin-
cipal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another
person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence
his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs, and when
the value of the benefit solicited, accepted or agreed to be accepted exceeds
1985]
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2. Definition of Bribery
Bribery has almost as many definitions as does the word "evil"
or "immorality." The subject requires separate and extensive study,
not here undertaken. For our purposes, we must keep in mind that
bribery is always associated with gross corruption.28
The verb "to bribe" is derived from and originally was defined
as "to steal."" Bouvier's 1914 Law Dictionary defines a briber simply
as "a thief."' One workable modern definition of bribery is "the act
or practice of giving, offering, or taking rewards for corrupt
practices."31 It is applied both to the one who gives and to the one
who receives.32
The difference between "commercial bribery"' and the bribery
of public officials has to do with the position held by the bribe-receiver.
In commercial bribery, he works for a private, rather than a public,
employer. The bribery of public officials is far graver, since it involves
the prostitution of a public trust.
The essence of the act of bribery is the giving of a gift or benefit
for the purpose of corruptly influencing an agent to discharge his duties
improperly. In that sense, it is the antithesis of honest pay received
for an honest day's work. It is dishonest pay received secretly to per-
form the dishonest bidding of the briber, in breach of the bribe-
receiver's duty toward his principal or employer, be such principal
or employer a public or private commercial entity.
When a briber gets "his man" (the bribe-receiver) within a system
of justice, politics, some branch of commerce, or within another's
one thousand dollars and causes economic harm to the employer or prin-
cipal in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars. Commercial bribe
receiving in the first degree is a class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW S 180.08 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1983-84). See also New York compa-
nion statutes: S 180.00 Commercial bribing in the second degree; S 180.03 Commercial
bribing in the first degree; S 180.05 Commercial bribe receiving in the second degree;
related statutes in Article 180, N.Y. PENAL LAW.
28. See McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 199 N.Y.S.2d
483, 166 N.E.2d 494 (1960); DRISCOLL, supra note 1.
29. THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA, AN ENCYCLOPEDIC LEXICON OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Vol. 1 (1911).
30. The definition, in its entirety, reads: "BRIBOUR. One who pilfers other
men's goods; a thief. See 28 Edw. II. c.l." BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 3d rev. 8th ed.
395 (1914).
31. THE WEBSTER'S NEW ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 226 (1977); see also DRISCOLL, supra note 1.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 14 and 27.
[Vol. 19
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business, "his man" has been "bought" and is thus "owned" by the
briber, although he officially works for another. What follows is a
boring-from-within betrayal process. Through "his man" the briber gets
what he wants from the employer and, to that extent, secretly con-
trols and thereby also "owns" the employer. The briber thus "steals"
the services and loyalty of the agent or employee from the employer.
Viewed in this light, bribery has been characterized not only as dif-
ferent from, but possibly worse' than any other species of crime, and
has been described as a form of "treason." 5
II. SCOPE OF ARTICLE
One recent case required the superimposing of the complex legal
problems involved with bribery onto the clockwork of the law of com-
mercial paper. The case was Bankers Trust v. Litton Systems, Inc.,"
decided in 1979 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, applying New York law. There, apparently for the first time,
a court was asked to decide whether bribery was a "real" 7 defense
against a holder in due course.' The court found it was not a "real"
but a "personal"39 defense, to be treated the same as fraud in the
inducement.0
This article analyzes the Bankers Trust decision and suggests,
in the interests of justice and in furtherance of the general public
34. "Bribery is thus different from other species of crime-worse, if you like-
but there is no reason to assume that bribery does not have its operational code."
REISMAN, supra note 1, at 2.
35. See supra note 13. Bribery is offensive and antithetical to our basic economic
philosophy insofar as it interferes with our need to maintain competitive conditions.
See, e.g., Continental Management, supra note 18. Since maintenance of competition
"is not viewed as a tampering with nature in favor of one class or another but as
a type of conservation, a fidelity to an essentially necessary state of nature," bribery
is the antithesis of our most fundamental policies and goals. REISMAN, supra note 1,
at 41. In contrast to American economic philosophy which is founded upon the
maintenance of free competition, consider Joe Bonanno's description of the economic
philosophy of organized crime. As a main objective, it seeks to establish and maintain
a strict system of monopolies. In his words, "If two Family members are bakers, they
are not allowed to own bakeries on the same block, for that would be bad for both
their businesses. They would be competing against each other." J. BONANNO with S.
LALLI, A MAN OF HONOR, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOSEPH BONANNO 79 (1983).
36. 599 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1979).
37. See infra note 80 as to "real" defenses.
38. See infra Part III.
39. See infra note 80 as to "personal" defenses.
40. 599 F.2d at 493. Fraud in the inducement is fraud as to the nature of
the transaction as contrasted to fraud in the execution (or "essential" fraud) which
is fraud as to the nature of the instrument.
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policy interest which New York has always had in condemning criminal
bribery, the court could and should have gone the other way. In any
event, the analysis clarifies that even if Bankers Trust is applicable
to the particular facts of that case, it does not purport to, nor should
it be construed as standing for the general principle that bribery is
not a "real" defense good against the holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument.4 '
III. HOLDER IN DUE COURSE IN THE LAW OF COMMERCIAL
PAPER: PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES
To cope with the issue of whether bribery is a good defense in
a civil action by a holder in due course, a basic understanding of the
underlying doctrines and the technical requirements of attaining holder
in due course status is necessary.
1. Philosophy
The holder in due course has been said to be the "emperor of
bona fide purchasers."' 2 The precursor of the concept of bona fide or
good faith purchaser appears primitively and as an ungerminated seed,
as early as 2250 B.C. in the Code of Hammurabi.' The first known
41. See infra note 83 as to the definition of "instrument."
42. WHITE AND SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 456 (1972). The holder in due course is "one of the few purchasers in Anglo Saxon
jurisprudence who may derive a good title from a chain of title that includes a thief in
its links." Id. at 459.
43. Sections 9-12 of this earliest Code provide:
9. If any one lose an article, and find it in the possession of another:
if the person in whose possession the thing is found say "A merchant
sold it to me, I paid for it before witnesses," and if the owner of the
thing say "I will bring witnesses who know my property," then shall the
purchaser bring the merchant who sold it to him, and the witnesses before
whom he bought it, and the owner shall bring witnesses who can identify
his property. The judge shall examine their testimony-both of the
witnesses before whom the price was paid, and of the witnesses who iden-
tify the lost article on oath. The merchant is then proven to be a thief
and shall be put to death. The owner of the lost article receives his
property, and he who bought it receives the money he paid from the estate
of the merchant.
10. If the purchaser does not bring the merchant and the witnesses
before whom he bought the article, but its owner bring witnesses who
identify it, then the buyer is the thief and shall be put to death, and
the owner receives the lost article.
11. If the owner do not bring witnesses to identify the lost article,
he is an evil-doer, he has traduced, and shall be put to death.
12. If the witnesses be not at hand, then shall the judge set a
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 2
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negotiable instrument" is likewise of Hammurabian vintage, although
the fertile idea45 of transferability and negotiability did not appear
in European law until thousands of years later in the late middle ages.'
By the mid-1700's, however, our current basic principles of the
law of commercial paper were clearly laid down in the decisions of
English courts. 7 In 1758, Lord Mansfield in the seminal case of Miller
v. Race "8 set forth the essential elements of the holder in due course
doctrine.49
The theory enunciated in Miller v. Race was that if T steals
money from victim V, V has a good cause of action against T to
recover the money. But if T has used the money and it eventually
finds it way into the hands of, for example, merchant M, who took
it for goods sold, V cannot recover the money from M.
Substituting bearer paper" for cash, if T steals bearer paper from
V, V cannot recover the instrument if it passes through commerce
limit, at the expiration of six months. If his witnesses have not appeared
within the six months, he is an evil-doer and shall bear the fine of the
pending case. Code of Hammurabi, B.C. 2250, Pamphlets, V1421, 12182.
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Library.
44. See supra note 8.
45. WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 69.
46. Id.
47. W. BRITTEN, BILLS AND NOTES 9 (2d ed. 1961).
48. 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
49. In Miller, supra, note 48 a demand promissory note in the amount of 21
pounds 10 shillings was made payable to William Finney or bearer. Finney mailed
the note to one Bernard Odenharty on December 11, 1756, but it was lost in a mail
robbery. Miller was an innkeeper who took the note for value on December 12th, in
the usual course of his business; but when he applied to the bank for payment, Race,
the bank clerk, refused either to pay the note or to redeliver it to Miller, because
the bank had been asked to stop its payment. Miller sued in trover for wrongful con-
version. Because he had taken the instrument for full and valuable consideration, and
in the usual course of his business and without any notice or knowledge that it had
been stolen, Miller prevailed. He was, although that term was not specifically coined,
a "holder in due course."
50. The law of commercial paper in the United States is embodied in the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Louisiana has adopted only Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7
and 8 of the UCC. UCC 1978 Official Text with Comments, Table 1, XLIII, n.3. The
New York UCC statutes are referred to as "UCC" followed by a section number. All
quotes of the text of the UCC statutes have been taken from the UCC 1978 Official
Text, supra. The UCC has been applied in bankruptcy proceedings (In re United Thrift
Stores, 363 F.2d 11, 14 (3rd Cir. 1966)) and "is generally considered to be the federal
law of commerce." In re Quantum, 397 F. Supp. 329, 336, n.2 (D.C. Virgin Islands D.
St. Croix 1975), citing In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 1971).
As to "bearer paper," UCC S 3-111 provides, "An instrument is payable to
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and finds its way into the hands of one we now call a holder in due
course;5' also, the issuer52 should ordinarily be liable to pay the holder
in due course if sued for the amount of the instrument.
Put another way, we have a general rule of law that "no one
can transfer a better title than he himself possesses:" Nemo dat quod
non habet."5 But one of the exceptions to this rule arises out of the
law merchant as to negotiable instruments.5 If such an instrument
passes to that "highly refined species of bona fide purchaser" known
as a holder in due course, he will take the instrument "free of con-
flicting title claims to the instrument itself 57 and, more importantly
for our purposes, free of almost all defenses of prior parties with whom
he has not dealt.' The holder in due course is accorded this extraor-
dinary protection not because of his "praiseworthy character"5 but
to facilitate all commercial transactions and encourage and assure the
free flow of negotiable instruments in commerce. The law desires
unfettered negotiability of instruments and to that end assures that
a holder in due course acquires the right to collect on instruments
he buys on the market without the need for any "elaborate
investigations" ' of the process and background leading up to the
bearer when by its terms it is payable to (a) bearer or the order of bearer; or (b)
a specified person or bearer; or (c) 'cash' or the order of 'cash,' or any other indication
which does not purport to designate a specific payee." See also UCC S 3-805.
51. See UCC S 3-302.
52. "Issue" means the first delivery of an instrument to a holder or remitter.
UCC S 3-102(1)(a). "Issuer" is not used in the UCC. The issuer of a draft or check
(see UCC S 3-104(2(b)) is denominated a "drawer" (see, e.g., UCC SS 3-104(1b), 3-110(1)(a)),
and the issuer of a note is denominated a "maker." Id. "Issuer" is used throughout
to encompass either a "drawer" or "maker."
53. Whistler v. Foster, 14 Common Bench (N.S.) 248, 257-258, 43 Eng. Rep.
441, 444-45 (1863).
54. Id.
55. Id. Since negotiable instruments are "part of the currency," they "are
subject to the same rule as money: and if such instrument be transferred in good
faith, for value, before it is overdue, it becomes available in the hands of a holder,
notwithstanding fraud which would have rendered it unavailable in the hands of a
previous holder." Id. The law of "negotiable instruments" in the United States today
is known as the law of Commercial Paper and is embodied for the most part in UCC
Article 3. See also UCC S 1-103.
56. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 456.
57. Id.
58. The holder in due course takes free of all defenses of a party with whom
he has not dealt except those potent defenses (commonly known as the "real" defenses)
described in the UCC. See UCC S 3-305(2).
59. Supra note 36, Bankers Trust at 599 F.2d at 494 citing Gilmore, The Com-
mercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
60. Id.
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issuance of those instruments. Any requirement to look beyond the
face of the instruments would be time-consuming and would thereby
impede their free flow.' Protection of the holder in due course tradi-
tionally has been likened to keeping "oil in the wheels of commerce.""2
Without the lubrication afforded by the holder in due course doctrine,
it is said that "those wheels would grind to a quick halt.""3
2. Some Basic Technical Prerequisites
To be a "holder in due course" of an instrument,' a person must
at least be a "holder" as defined in UCC S 1-201:5 he must not only
be in possession of the instrument, but it must have been properly
issued' or negotiated 7 to him. An instrument payable to order" and
delivered to a transferee cannot be further negotiated or enforced
by the transferee without indorsement. 9 Without such an indorsement,
there is an incomplete negotiation. One given unindorsed order paper
is a mere contract assignee. He stands in the shoes of his assignor
and is incapable, until he attains the status of a "holder"7 of acquir-
ing the rights accorded to holders under UCC § 3-301."' A fortiori,
such a transferee, because he is not a holder, cannot attain the rights
of a holder in due course. One to whom order paper has been delivered
without indorsement has the specifically enforceable right to have the
61. The holder in due course is entitled to rely "on the contract rights of
one who offers [the contract or instrument] for sale or to secure a loan." Id.
62. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 457.
63. Id.
64. See infra note 83 as to the definition of "instrument."
65. "Holder" is "a person who is in possession of a document of title or an
instrument or a certificated investment security drawn, issued, or indorsed to him
or his order or to bearer or in blank." UCC S 1-201(20). See also UCC S 1-201(5) as
to definition of "bearer."
66. See supra note 52 as to the definition of "issue."
67. "Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the
transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated
by delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by
delivery." UCC S 3-202(1).
68. UCC S 3-110(1) in part provides: "An instrument is payable to order when
by its terms it is payable to the order or assigns of any person therein specified with
reasonable certainty, or to him or his order, or when it is conspicuously designated
on its face as 'exchange' or the like and names a payee .... See also UCC S 3-805.
69. The right of indorsement is covered in UCC 5 3-201. The types of
indorsements and their effect are important throughout Article 3 of the UCC, and
are treated in detail, especially in UCC S 3-202 through 3-206.
70. See supra note 64.
71. Whether or not he is the owner, a holder of an instrument may transfer
or negotiate it and, except as otherwise provided in UCC S 3-603, discharge it or enforce
payment in his own name. See UCC S 3-301(3).
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unqualified indorsement of his transferor:2 he may demand the
indorsement and, should it fail to be forthcoming, apply to a court
of equity for a decree directing the transferor unqualifiedly to indorse."
Negotiation is complete only when the indorsement is made, until which
time the law provides no presumption even that the transferee owns
the instrument."4 Upon receiving the indorsement, the transferee
becomes a holder and thereby may be able to achieve the status of
holder in due course.
Bearer paper,75 in contrast to order paper," may be properly and
completely negotiated by delivery alone,77 and is the closest thing to
cash in the world of commercial paper. As we saw in Miller v. Race,"8
it can move from hand to hand without so much as the tip of a pen
touching it.
UCC S 3-305 provides that a holder in due course will take the
instrument free from claims to it on the part of any person" and free
from what we commonly call "personal defenses"' of any party with
whom he has not dealt.
72. UCC S 3-201(3).
73. Id.
74. Id. A recent British case shows the broad general correlation of the UCC
provisions to long-standing English law. To attain the rights of a holder or holder
in due course, the court explains, "the holder of the bill must, if it be payable to
order, obtain an indorsement and ...he is affected by notice of a fraud received
before he does so. Until he does so, he is merely in the position of the assignee of
an ordinary chose in action, and has no better right than his assignor. When he does
so, he is affected by fraud which he knew of before the indorsement." Bank of Cyprus
v. Jones, Q.B., February 24, 1984 (12th para. of decision) quoting Whistler v. Foster,
supra note 53.
75. See supra note 50 as to "bearer paper."
76. See supra note 68.
77. See UCC S 3-202(1) at supra note 67.
78. Supra notes 48, and 49.
79. UCC S 3-305(1).
80. Some of the "personal defenses" are set forth in UCC j 3-306. By "per-
sonal" defenses we mean all those which are not "real" defenses. UCC S 3-305 sets
forth the real defenses, as follows:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instru-
ment free from (1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and (2) all
defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt except (a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple
contract; and (b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and (c) such
misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
character or its essential terms; and (d) discharge in insolvency proceedings;
and (e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes
[Vol. 19
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There are five elements required for a "holder" to be a holder
in due course, all of which are set forth in UCC S 3-302."' One must be
1. A holder"2 of a
2. Negotiable instrument,83 who takes it for
3. Value" and in
4. Good faith" and
5. Without notice" that it was overdue or has been dishonored
or of any defense or claim to it on the part of any person."
One who is not himself a holder in due course because he cannot
fulfill all the substantive (and substantial88 ) requirements of UCC 5
3-302 may nevertheless attain the rights of a holder in due course
if he took the instrument from a holder in due course.89 In that way,
for example, an instrument transferred as a gift may give an eligible
donee' the same rights the donor had."1 If the donor was a holder
in due course, the donee normally attains his rights. There is yet one
the instrument.
81. UCC S 3-302 provides: "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the
instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue
or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person." UCC S 3-302(1). See also UCC S 9-206.
82. UCC S 3-302(1); see also UCC S 1-201(20), UCC SS 3-305, 3-306, 3-202(1). Cf.
UCC S 9-206 where this term is inapplicable.
83. For UCC Article 3 purposes "instrument" means negotiable instrument.
UCC S 3-102(1)(e). Cf. UCC S 9-206 at text corresponding to note 93 infra. See also
infra note 97.
84. 1,CC S 3-302(1)(a); see also UCC SS 3-303, 9-206, 1-201(44), 4-208, 4-209 and
WHITE AND SUMMERS, note 42 supra, at 465-71.
85. Id. at 471-72; UCC S 3-302(1)(b); UCC S 9-206.
86. UCC S 3-302(1)(c); UCC S 9-206; see UCC SS 1-201(25), 3-304; WHITE AND
SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 472-77.
87. UCC S 3-302(1)(c). See also UCC SS 3-305, 3-306. UCC S 9-206 requires only
that the assignee take his assignment "for value, in good faith, and without notice
of a claim or defense .... "
88. At first blush the requirements listed in UCC S 3-302(1) may seem
straightforward. Several of these elements, however, "are but doors which open onto
breath-taking vistas of complex statutory and decisional law." WHITE AND SUMMERS,
supra note 42 at 458.
89. See UCC S 3-201 as to the Code's "shelter" provisions.
90. Id. See infra note 91.
91. A transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument or who had notice of a defense or claim against it as a prior
holder cannot improve his position and benefit by the shelter provisions. See UCC
S 3-201(1). Otherwise, the transferee obtains holder in due course rights if the transfer
was by a holder in due course. Official Comment 2, UCC S 3-201.
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more way of acquiring the rights of a holder in due course, and that
is covered by UCC S 9-206 which pertains to assignees of certain
buyers or lessees of non-consumer goods.92 UCC § 9-206 in part
provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a dif-
ferent rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an
agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee
who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and
without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses
of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Com-
mercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one trans-
action signs both a negotiable instrument and a security
agreement makes such an agreement.9"
In the Bankers Trust94 case, we therefore see the term "holder in due
course" applied to the assignee of a lease 5 (meaning one coming under
the provisions of UCC 9-206). "Holder in due course" under Article
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code speaks only to a holder of a
negotiable instrument. "Instrument" itself, under Article 3, means a
"negotiable instrument;"" and "holder in due course" in both UCC
S 3-302 and 3-305 speaks to holders of an "instrument," meaning a
negotiable instrument.' The holder in due course, under current law,"
is a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable instrument, or one having
those rights by virtue of the shelter provisions of UCC § 3-201; 9
92. Goods are "consumer goods" if they are bought or used primarily for
household, family or personal purposes. See UCC S 9-109(1); Laurel Bank & Trust Co.
v. Mark Ford, Inc., 182 Conn. 437, 438 A.2d 705, 707 (1980).
93. UCC S 9-206(1). Note that Louisiana has not adopted Article 9 of the UCC.
See supra note 50.
94. Supra note 36.
95. 599 F.2d 491.
96. Supra note 83.
97. Under Article 3 of the UCC the most acute of preliminary questions in
determining whether one should be accorded the exalted status of a holder in due
course is whether he holds a negotiable instrument. See definitions in UCC SS 3-104(1)
and 3-105, 3-112. The presumption is against negotiability, since all technical statutory
requirements must be met before an instrument will be deemed "negotiable." Under
Article 3, one can be a holder in due course only of a negotiable instrument; however,
an assignee may also attain the rights of holder in due course under UCC S 9-206.
98. Governed in all states in the United States by the UCC. Louisiana, however,
has not passed UCC Article 9. See supra note 50.
99. See supra note 91.
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but he may also acquire the rights of a holder in due course as an
assignee of a contract or lease of non-consumer goods, under the sup-
plementary provisions of UCC S 9-206.1°
The key import of the holder in due course doctrine, for our pur-
poses, is that one with holder in due course status takes free of all
defenses of any party with whom he has not dealt except "real"
defenses. These "real" defenses are only those few rare and potent
ones described in UCC § 3-305(2)(a) through (e)."1 The "personal"
defenses are all others.0 2
Most of the litigation involving holders in due course has nothing
to do with the claims or defenses to which they are subject. Rather,
the cases pivot on whether holder in due course status has been
established. Once it is shown that a defense exists, the person claim-
ing the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing
all the elements set forth in UCC S 3-302.103 Only if he sustains this
often weighty burden does he attain the rights of a holder in due
course; and only then does the question of whether the defense is
"real" or "personal" become an issue.0 '
IV. ILLEGALITY AS A "REAL" DEFENSE
UCC § 3-305 provides that any holder in due course is subject
to the real defense of illegality, but only "such . .. illegality of the
transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity."1 5 Whether
the "illegality" is or is not of such a degree of severity as to render
the obligation of the party a nullity and void is "primarily a matter
of local concern and local policy.""1 6 It is therefore left to "the local
100. See supra text corresponding to note 93.
101. See supra note 80.
102. Id. See also UCC S 3-306; Official Comment 5 to UCC S 3-306.
103. UCC S 3-307(3).
104. See supra note 80. The term "real" defense is pre-Code in origin, is not
used in the UCC, but connotes those defenses set forth in UCC S 3-305(2)(a) through (e).
105. UCC S 3-305(2)(b). See text of statute supra note 80.
106. Official Comment 6 to UCC S 3-305 states:
Duress is a matter of degree. An instrument signed at the point of a
gun is void, even in the hands of a holder in due course. One signed under
threat to prosecute the son of the maker for theft may be merely voidable,
so that the defense is cut off. Illegality is most frequently a matter of
gambling or usury, but may arise in many other forms under a great
variety of statutes. The statutes differ greatly in their provisions and the
interpretations given them. They are primarily a matter of local concern
and local policy. All such matters are therefore left to the local law. If
under that law the effect of the duress or the illegality is to make the
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law""' 7 to resolve. If under local law the effect of the illegality is "to
make the obligation entirely null and void, the defense may be asserted
against a holder in due course. Otherwise it is cut off."'08 The example
proffered by the Official Code Commentators is, "Illegality is most
frequently a matter of gambling or usury, but may arise in many other
forms under a great variety of statutes."'0 9
When we deal with such illegality as renders the obligation of
the party a nullity,"0 it is well to keep in mind that an instrument
normally is given for an "underlying obligation.'. That is, the issuer
most frequently uses it to pay for some obligation. Ordinarily,"' unless
otherwise agreed, the obligation to pay is suspended until the instru-
ment is due or presented.'13 If it is dishonored, an action may be main-
tained either on the instrument or the obligation."'
1. "Illegally Void": Definitions and Difficulties
The word "illegality" does not refer to the violation of criminal
statutes alone. A contract is "illegal," the Restatement tells us, "if
either its formation or its performance is criminal, tortious, or other-
wise opposed to public policy.""' 5 The word "illegality" in UCC §
obligation entirely null and void, the defense may be asserted against
a holder in due course. Otherwise it is cut off.
107. Id.
108. Id. See also the broad scope provisions of UCC S 1-103.
109. Id.
110. UCC S 3-305(2)(b).
111. See UCC S 3-802.
112. But not if a bank is a drawer or primarily liable on the instrument: see
UCC S 3-802(1) and (1)(a).
113. See UCC S 3-802(1)(b). The word "suspended" is intended to include suspen-
sion of the running of the statute of limitations (UCC S 3-122). Official Comment 3
to UCC S 3-802.
114. UCC S 3-802(1)(b). See UCC S 3-601 and Official Comment 3 to UCC 3-802
as to discharge of the obligor.
115. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 512 (1932). See also Hanley v. Savannah Bank
& Trust Co., 208 Ga. 585, 68 S.E.2d 581 (1952) (agreement by mother to surrender
possession of her infant to get a benefit under a will void); cf. Andrews, The Stork
Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, 70 A.B.A.J. 50 (1984); Coleman,
Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN.
L. REV. 71 (1982); Randon v. Toby, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 493 (1850) (in state where slavery
tolerated, buying and selling of slaves not illegal.) "It is impossible to define with
accuracy what is meant by public policy for an interference and violation of which
a contract may be declared invalid. It may be understood in general that contracts
which are detrimental to the interests of the public as understood at the time fall
within the ban." Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233-234 (1892).
"We are not required to look exclusively to statutory enactments in determining ques-
tions of public policy. Constitutions and statutes are evidence of the general public
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3-305(2)(b), therefore, is broader than it may first appear, but at the
same time narrower: it is wide enough to encompass contracts which
are not only criminal but merely tortious1t0 or "contrary to the best
interests of citizens as a matter of public policy" '117 whether or not
there has been any proper expression about it;1"' but the illegality
under UCC § 3-305 must be such as renders the obligation of the party,
under local law, void.
There does exist a general rule that an illegal contract is "void."1 9
But, not surprisingly, the rule has a vast number of exceptions."M Fur-
thermore, many statutes which use the word "void" permit a court
to refuse enforcement of an entire contract, but also permit excision
of an offensive clause and enforcement of the remainder of the
contract. 2' Hence, although these statutes contain the word "void,"
policy of a state; but when confronted with questions of general public policy, as defined
in the books, the courts go beyond express legislation and look to the whole body
of law-statutory, common, and judicial decisions." Holland v. Sheehan, 108 Minn. 362,
367, 122 N.W. 1, 3 (1909).
116. For example, it has been held in New York that to bargain to commit
a tort is illegal. Reiner v. North American Newspaper Alliance, 259 N.Y. 250, 257 (1932).
117. Anaconda Federal Credit Union No. 4401 v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178,
483 P.2d 909, 911 (1971).
118. Id. For example, it might be against public policy to enforce a contract
provision providing that a party will not interpose the defense of usury, the statute
of limitations, or failure of consideration. Pope Manufacturing, supra note 115 at 235.
See also Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935).
119. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS SS 598, 607 (1932).
120. See id., S 236(a); RESTATEMENT OF (SECOND) CONTRACTS S 229(a) (1973); 4
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1961) S 620; J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1977) 785-799; Symcox v. Zuk, 221 Cal. App. 2d 383, 34 Cal. Rptr. 462
(1963). Usury, "Blue Sky" or other remedial statutes passed to protect a certain class
of people sometimes give the plaintiff within the protected class a valid cause of
action against a defendant who, by statute, is deemed the wrongdoer. 15 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1972) SS 1754, 1755, 1756; 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 1540 (1963).
An agreement illegal because of its wrongful purpose may nevertheless give rise to
a valid cause of action by an innocent party if only one of them had an illegal purpose.
RESTATEMENT OF (SECOND) CONTRACTS S 602. See also infra note 121.
121. See, e.g., UCC S 2-302 as to unconscionable contracts or clauses. New York
also has a large number of statutes which declare a covenant, promise, agreement or
understanding in, or in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement to
be void: See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW S 5-322.1 (McKinney 1978) entitled, "Agreements
exempting owners and contractors from liability for negligence void and unenforceable;
certain cases;" S 5-321 entitled, "Agreements exempting lessors from liability for
negligence void and unenforceable;" S 5-311 entitled, "Certain agreements between
husband and wife void;" S 5-301 entitled, "Certain employment contracts void;" S 5-322
entitled, "Agreements exempting caterers and catering establishments from liability
for negligence void and unenforceable;" S 5-323 entitled, "Agreements exempting building
service or maintenance contractors from liability for negligence void and unenforceable;"
S 5-325 entitled, "Garages and parking places;" S 5-326 entitled, "Agreements exempting
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whether the illegality would be such as to render the obligation of
the party a nullity would be left to judicial interpretation."
For example, one of New York's"I most encompassing statutes
of frauds.. starts, "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void,
unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing....
Yet the term "void" here means only unenforceable (rather than even
voidable). The lack of a writing if not timely pleaded as an affirmative
defense is waived. 26 It is equally clear everywhere else outside New
York 127 that an oral contract within the purview of a given statute
of frauds is not "illegal"'128: it is neither "criminal nor offensive to
general policy"" but at worst a contract "lacking a couple of legal
chromosomes.""' This, despite the fact that "void" or "no action shall
be brought".. habitually appear in these various statutes of fraud.
Corbin cautions that the common meaning of "void" is "total
absence of legal effect,"" but that even in the term "void contract"
pools, gymnasiums, places of public amusement or recreation and similar establishments
from liability for negligence void and unenforceable;" S 5-324 entitled, "Agreements
by owners, contractors, subcontractors or suppliers to indemnify architects, engineers
and surveyors from liability caused by or arising out of defects in maps, plans, designs
and specifications void and unenforceable;" S 5-511 entitled "Usurious contracts void;"
S 5-331 entitled, "Certain covenants and restrictions in conveyances and other
agreements affecting real property void as against public policy;" S 5-415 entitled, "Cer-
tain transfers of property in pursuance of lottery, void;" S 5-501 entitled, "Rate of
interest, usury forbidden;" S 5-413 entitled, "Securities for money lost at gaming, void;"
S 5-401 entitled, "Illegal wagers, bets and stakes;" S 5-417 entitled, "Contracts,
agreements and securities on account of raffling, void;" S 5-331 entitled, "Certain
covenants and restrictions in conveyances and other agreements affecting real property
void as against public policy.'
122. It has been said, for example, that "An act or contract neither wrong
in itself nor against public policy which has been declared void by statute for the
protection or benefit of a certain party, or class of parties, is voidable only. U.S. v.
New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 36 S. Ct. 41, 42, 60 L. Ed. 161; Weede
v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, 397, 398."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1745 (4th ed. 1968).
123. There is "no common law statute of frauds. Each state has its own statute."
J. DAWSON, W. HARVEY AND S. HENDERSON, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CONTRACTS, 951 (4th
ed. 1982).
124. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW S 5-701 (McKinney 1978).
125. Id. S 5-701(a).
126. Sanger v. French, 157 N.Y. 213, 51 N.E. 979 (1898).
127. DAWSON, HARVEY AND HENDERSON, supra note 123, at 967.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 968.
130. Id.
131. Section 4 of the original 1677 statute of frauds uses the words "no action
shall be brought." See id. at 952 setting forth the statute.
132. I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1963) S 7 p. 15. "One who says that an agreement
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there is an intrinsic self-contradiction." "Contract" by definition always
includes "some element of enforceability. '" u He thus prefers "void
agreement" to "void contract."'' 5
As to voidness, Corbin emphasizes the cruciality of judicial
interpretation stating, "Even if a statute expressly declares an agree-
ment to be illegal or void, justice requires and the courts have con-
tinually decided that the effect of such a statute upon a particular
case must depend upon the circumstances of that case. The words
of the statute will be interpreted in the light of the purpose of the
statute, with due regard to the result that will be reached by the
interpretation."'36
Thus, as the New Howard'37 case emphasizes: "An instrument
which a statute, expressly or through necessary implication declares
void, strictly speaking is a simulacrum only. It is without legal efficacy.
It cannot obligate a party or support a right."'' So that even though
the word "void" is not used, an agreement may be void by statutory
implication.
Most criminal statutes ordinarily stick to the knitting of describ-
ing what conduct they prohibit. Hence, most never get to "void" or
"voidable" at all, words which languish in the more civilized world
of contracts. Taking one example at random, "Robbery" in S 160.10
of the N.Y. Penal Law"9 sets forth the elements of the crime and
then affixes its statutory classification: "Robbery in the second degree
is a class C felony."'' There the statute ends. It does not speak to
or promise is 'void' usually supposes that it has no legal operation whatever, being
in many cases quite unaware that a number of important legal relations have been
created." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 17.
137. New Howard Mfg. Co. v. Cohen, 207 A.D. 588, 202 N.Y.S. 449 (1st Dept.
1924).
138. Id. at 202 N.Y.S. 451, emphasis added. The New Howard court explains
why an instrument issued in defraud of creditors was not void, although a crime was
involved under the then Bankruptcy Law, because the statute did not specify the
instrument was to be treated as void. The holding is unremarkable because the crime
involved was criminal fraud in the inducement, rather than the real defense of fraud
in the execution; the statute had been amended to excise a previously included "void"
provision; and bankruptcy laws are not a matter of local state public policy. All New
Howard holds is that fraud in the inducement may be criminal, but still not a real
defense against a holder in due course.
139. McKinney's supra note 23, at Book 39, 201-202.
140. Id. at 202.
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whether a contract to commit robbery, or one induced by, tainted with,
connected to, or resulting from such robbery is "void" or "voidable."
The same applies to almost all other criminal statutes, including New
York's commercial bribery statutes.
2. Criminal Illegality as "Penalized" in a Civil Action
Ultimately, determining whether the obligation under UCC
3-305 is "illegally void" is a judgmental and labeling challenge. It is
a buck envisioned to be passed to the local court, where it stops. It
is the local court's function to perceive and implement local public
policy. Thus, in a civil action, the court has inherent power to control
the interpretation and application of criminal statutes, insofar as it
expounds upon and teaches both the litigants and the public as to
the meaning and impact of criminal statutes. And, by the very nature
of a civil proceeding, it does so in a swift and effective manner,
unimpeded by the constrictions inherent in criminal prosecutions. This
power is especially effective in the sphere of commercial bribery.
Bribery is all about money, and money is what the civil court has
the power to give or not to give.
Thus, what is crucial to the vortex of our topic is that the punish-
ment set forth in any penal statute is not the exclusive or even most
effective "price" or penalty for that crime. Irrespective of any fines
or sentences imposed upon a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt
in a criminal case, in a civil action the court can find the illegal con-
duct mandates a forfeiture of property.
This was the jurisprudential feat performed in Riggs v. Palmer,"'
now a legend in American legal folklore. In his dissent"" in Riggs,
141. The Riggs maxim set forth, "No one shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage of his wrong, or to found any claim upon his own
iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public
policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries
and have nowhere been superseded by statutes." Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512
(1889). Although Riggs is frequently cited by American courts as the source of these
maxims, their, origin is much older. That one may not profit from his own wrong has
been found to be one of some 214 maxims of Edmund Wingate published in London
in 1658. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the
Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. OF CHic. L. REV. 632, 645 (1981). But their ultimate
source has been traced back to "Ulpian in Digest 50.17.134.1 where it appears as nemo
ex delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest." Id. This Digest was compiled by
Domitus Ulpianus, a Phoenician born about A.D. 170. J. MUIRHEAD, THE INSTITUTES OF
GAIUS AND RULES OF ULPIAN xiii (1880).
142. 115 N.Y. at 519.
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Judge Gray anguished, "What power or warrant have the courts to
add to the respondent's penalties by depriving him of property? The
law has punished him for his crime and we may not say that it was
an insufficient punishment."'4 In a superb exposition of advanced
justiciary, the majority exhibited just what power the civil court had.
The power to do justice, as Riggs demonstrates, is almost boundless.
That the Legislature understood civil courts would and should
exact penalties in addition to those imposed by criminal statutes is
evidenced by rarely cited language contained in the criminal statutes
themselves. Present N. Y. PENAL LAW S 5.10, derived from an 1881
statute'" predating Riggs specifically provides:
(3) This chapter does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect
any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture or other
remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in
a civil action, regardless of whether the conduct involved
in such civil action constitutes an offense defined in this
chapter. 1' 5
Riggs never cited this statute's predecessor. A civil court does not
need statutory language as authority for its power to "penalize" per-
sons seeking to take advantage of illegal bargains.
From the 1889 Adam's rib holding in Riggs, over 70 years later
was wrought the Eve we see in McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures
Corporation.4" Both cases are cited in Bankers Trust. '
When Elmer Palmer murdered his grandfather, Riggs held he
forfeited his legacy under his grandfather's will.' 8 When Fred
McConnell allegedly bribed a producer's agent to get the film distribu-
tion contract for Commonwealth, he forfeited his right to collect under
his commissions contract.
In McConnell's suit for an accounting, the defense was that he
should not be permitted access to the court because he had bribed
an agent of Universal Pictures to obtain the contract for Com-
monwealth. The court held the issue was not "whether the acts alleged
in the defenses would constitute the crime of commercial bribery." '
143. Id.
144. N.Y. PENAL LAWS S 5.10(3) (McKinney 1975) is derived from N.Y. PENAL LAW
1909 SS 23, 24, 37, all of which were derived from the Penal Code of 1881. See supra
Historical Note, McKinney's note 23, Book 39, p. 15.
145. Id. at 14-15.
146. See supra note 28.
147. 599 F.2d at 491, 492.
148. Riggs v. Palmer, supra note 141.
149. 7 N.Y.2d at 470.
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McConnell's motion to strike the defenses for insufficiency was treated
as his constructive admission'O of those facts. McConnell thereby was
deemed an unworthy plaintiff, seeking to take advantage of his own
wrong, and to acquire property by his own crime. He could not recover
commissions for having obtained a bribery-induced contract. The power
of Riggs was upon him. But the court said "all" they were doing was
"labeling the conduct described in these defenses as gross corruption
depriving plaintiff of access to the courts of New York State.. 5
McConnell may not have been indictable, no less "convictable" beyond
a reasonable doubt in a criminal case. It made no difference. He never-
theless was heavily penalized by the judgment in the civil case. Com-
monwealth was left with its bountiful windfall, enjoying the fruits of
the contract McConnell had brought to them. McConnell wound up
with nothing for all his efforts. 5 '
And it was the McConnell decision which barred one of the plain-
tiffs from summary judgment in the Bankers Trust case," which we
now examine.
V. FACTS AND RATIONALE OF BANKERS TRUST V. LITTONlM
Litton, the defendant, had decided to buy some photocopiers. 5
Angelo Buquicchio, a salesman who worked for Royal, a division of
one of Litton's subsidiaries, recommended Litton lease the photocopiers
from Regent Leasing, an outside entity." Regent was to buy the equip-
ment from Royal and then lease it to Litton. Neither Royal nor Litton
knew Buquicchio would be making money in this transaction.'57
Regent's president when later deposed admitted that he paid money
150. Words used in Flegenheimer v. Brogen, 284 N.Y. 268, 272 (1940).
151. 7 N.Y.2d 471.
152. McConnell originally got $10,000 from Commonwealth. Taking the defenses
as true, he gave the producer's agent $10,000. He was to get 20% of certain recouped
gross receipts realized on the distribution of 40 Western and four serial motion pic-
tures, simultaneously with further payments Commonwealth was obliged to make to
the producer. Lower court in McConnell at 1 Misc.2d 751, 752 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Com-
monwealth had originally counterclaimed for the return of this $10,000 but never ap-
pealed its being brushed aside in the lower court. McConnell never received anything
other than the first $10,000 which he allegedly used for the bribe.
153. Motion for summary judgment by plaintiff Regent denied, in reliance on
McConnell, 599 F.2d at 491.
154. See supra note 36.
155. 599 F.2d at 490.
156. Regent was entirely independent of either Litton or Royal. Id.
157. Id.
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to several Royal people, "particularly Buquicchio, so they would push
leases generally and Regent's leases specifically."''M To finance its pur-
chases, Regent had borrowed money from the plaintiff banks, assign-
ing the Litton leases as security.' 9 The leases contained a provision
allowing assignment and a clause providing the assignees' rights would
be independent of any claims or offsets of Litton as against Regent.'0
When Litton defaulted, a suit was started by the banks and Regent,
followed by motions for summary judgment. The heart of the defense
was that the bribery of Royal's employees rendered Litton's obliga-
tion null and void. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's
holding that the payments to Buquicchio "could constitute a defense
against Regent.''. However, it was not a good defense against the
banks as UCC § 9-206 holders in due course. Under New York law,
the court concluded, "a holder in due course may treat a contract
inducted by illegal bribery as merely voidable."'62 To analyze the
court's reasoning, the argument of the court has been broken down
into three tiers, to show its progression, then each tier is separately
treated, infra.
The substance of the court's reasoning was as follows:
TIER 1. In using the word "nullity" in UCC § 3-305, the "Legislature
iitended to provide a defense against a holder in due course only
in cases where the obligation sued upon is void on its face (e.g. a
wagering contract or a contract to perform an illegal act). .. .
TIER 2. "An examination of bribery-induced contracts suggests that
New York holds such contracts to be 'void.""" "Confusion in the use
of the words 'void' and 'voidable' is common."'6 5 Chiefly the difference
becomes important only where property is transferred to a holder
in due course." Since the New York cases on illegal contracts induced
by commercial bribery do not involve holders in due course, one may
assume "void" was used loosely, "without regard to its importance
158. Id.
159. Id. This was not the usual "leveraged" lease transaction. Had it been,
query as to whether plaintiffs would have been denied holder in due course status,
having "dealt" with Litton. UCC S 3-305(2).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 491 relying on McConnell, supra note 28.
162. Id. at 492.
163. Id. at 491. These were the observations of the court below which were
quoted with approval.
164. Id.
165. Id., quoting from RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 475, comment b (1932).
166. Id.
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when a holder in due course enters the picture."'' 1 A voidable con-
tract may be ratified, while a void transaction cannot.'68 "Sirkin v.
Fourteenth Street Store . . .suggests that the court meant the con-
tract to be truly 'void' because it "could not be ratified ... .
TIER 3. However, the policy supporting the New York cases is one
precluding recovery to a wrongdoer. 170 Where an innocent holder in
due course "is suing upon an illegal contract, the policy argument is
inapplicable because the plaintiff has done no wrong for which it should
be penalized. 1 1 "Bribery which induces the making of a contract is
much like fraud which has the same result ...""' Since fraud in the
inducement is a personal, not a real, defense under UCC § 3-305(2),
"the same treatment should be given to a contract induced by
bribery."'13 Denying recovery to holders in due course would probably
167. Id.
168. Id. at 492 quoting from RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 475, comment b
(1932).
169. Id., referring to Sirkin, supra note 21.
170. Id., citing inter alia, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 598, comment a, (1932);
14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S 1630A (3d ed. 1972); Riggs v. Palmer, supra note 141,
McConnell, supra note 28; Riener, supra note 116.
171. Id. at 492-93.
172. Id. at 493.
173. Id. Here the court refers to RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 577, "Illustra-
tions 4 & 11 (1932)." Id. Referring to this authority, one sees S 577 is entitled, "Bargains
to Defraud or Harm Third Persons." The following rule is then set forth: "A bargain
performance of which would tend to harm third persons by deceiving them as to material
facts, or by defrauding them, or without justification by other means is illegal." The
RESTATEMENT continues:
Comment: a. Cases falling within the rule stated in the Section would
generally, but not always involve the commission of a tort and therefore
fall within the rule stated in S 571.
b. The tendency of the performance to deceive or otherwise
harm others sometimes necessarily follows from the character of the per-
formance promised, but in other cases the performance promised may be
used innocently or may be used in such a way as to harm or defraud
others. In such cases it is the purpose so to use the performance that
makes the bargain illegal. The purpose may be entertained by one or by
both parties to the contract. If entertained by one only, the other party
may recover for a breach of the contract (see S 602). If an improper pur-
pose is entertained by both parties to the contract, neither can recover.
Illustrations 4 and 11 cited by Bankers Trust set forth:
4. A desires to by land from B at a low price. C is aware
of facts which, if told B, will induce him to refuse to sell for such a price.
A promises C $500 if C will not tell B the facts in question. C does not
tell B. The agreement is illegal.
11. A agrees with B to pay B $500 if B causes a legislative
investigation of the affairs of a corporation. A's purpose is to depress
[Vol. 19
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not "have an appreciable effect on the frequency of commercial bribery.
Moreover, the holder in due course concept embodies important
policies which must be weighed against the policy of holding void,
contracts induced by bribery."'74
Taking these three points in order:
COMMENT AS TO TIER 1. This statement appears misleading. If
the obligation sued upon is void on its face (e.g., indicates it is a wager-
ing contract or a contract to perform an illegal act, the examples
proffered by the court), there could not be a holder in due course.
The holder would take with "notice" '175 that the obligation is illegal
and, having notice of a defense, he would be unable to establish his
status under UCC S 3-302(1)(c). He might also have trouble in sustain-
ing his burden of establishing his good faith.178
Even a "small" irregularity which should have been spotted on
the face of an instrument will bar establishment of holder in due course
status. Thus, in a typical "notice" case, a man had signed both his
name and his wife's name, placing his initials after the wife's signature
on a note. When the purchasing bank sued on it, failure of considera-
tion was raised as a defense. The bank could not establish it was a
holder in due course because of the "irregularity" of the initials next
to the one signature. On appeal, the finding was affirmed.'77
UCC § 3-304 itself specifies that the purchaser has notice of a
claim or defense if "(a) the instrument is ...so irregular as to call
into question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity
as to the party to pay; or * * * (2) the purchaser has notice that the
obligation of any party is voidable in whole or in part, or that all par-
ties have been discharged."'7 8 It thus appears that any contract illegal
on its face could not, by definition, pass to a holder in due course.
the value of the shares and to obtain profit from selling short. B causes
the investigation and produces the desired result. The bargain is illegal.
Neither of these illustrations seems apposite to acts prohibited under the New
York Commercial Bribery statutes in that the parties to whom money is offered in
these examples is not an employee or agent of the victim of the fraud. The crime
of commercial bribery has at its heart the necessary element that the bribe-receiver
is an employee or agent. Thus, commercial bribery is a far graver act than fraud.
Its "treason" element (see n. 13 supra) is the essence of the crime, and that element
is missing in both these illustrations.
174. 599 F.2d at 493.
175. See UCC SS 3-302, 3-304, 9-206; see also UCC S 1-201(25) as to when a per-
son has "notice" of a fact.
176. "Notice" and "good faith," although hardly identical, "appear in the cases
and in the flesh as first cousins." WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 471.
177. Arcanum National Bank v. Hessler, 69 Ohio St.2d 549, 433 N.E.2d 204 (1982).
178. UCC S 3-304 (emphasis added).
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The concept makes good sense. The "would-be holder in due course""17
simply "does not deserve to take free of such defenses, for he could
have refused to take"'80 the instrument or proffered transaction.
More importantly, as to Article 3 instruments, a check or simple
promissory note might be issued by A, a debtor, payable to L, a loan-
shark, as follows:
July 27, 1984
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I promise to pay to the order of
L the sum of ................................ $5,000.00
payable in 30 days.
(Signed) A
If this instrument were given in return for a $4,000 loan made by
L to A on July 27, 1984, in New York the note could be truly void
as criminally usurious8 ' and the usury defense would be a real defense
against a holder in due course. 12 Furthermore, the note could also
be usurious and truly void in New York were it given for a loan at
interest in excess of 16% per annum (although it would not be criminally
usurious'). Thus, it would be void in the hands of a holder in due
course, even though no criminal statute was violated.1 4 To boot, in
New York a usurious transaction is "not so utterly void"'8 5 that it
179. White and Summers explain the rationale of UCC S 3-304:
A party can acquire notice of a defense in a variety of ways. He can
observe that the instrument is crudely altered; he can see that its date
for payment has already passed; he can note that it has been stamped
'paid,' or he may even have actual knowledge of a contract defense of
the drawer or maker. In all such cases a would-be holder in due course does
not deserve to take free of such defenses, for he could have refused to
take the instrument.
Id., supra note 42, at 471.
180. Id.
181. N.Y. PENAL LAW SS 190.40, 190.42. This would not apply to certain exempt
transactions, such as any loan or forbearance in the amount of $2,500,000 or over as
provided in GOL 5-501(6)(b) and would not apply in several other exceptions outlined
in the GEN. OBLIG. See GEN. OBLIG. SS 5-501 through 5-531.
182. Sabine v. Paine, 223 N.Y. 401, 119 N.E. 849 (1918), cited by Bankers Trust,
599 F.2d at 493.
183. GEN. OBLIG. SS 5-501, 5-511.
184. Sabine v. Paine, supra note 182.
185. Smith v. Marvin, 27 N.Y. 137, 143 (1863); Graham v. Weiss, 3 Misc. 2d
28, 30, 149 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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cannot be ratified. To the extent that a debtor repays any portion
of the loan, he is deemed to have ratified' the transaction and can-
not recover, except to the extent of any amount in excess of the legal
rate of interest."7 If he had paid nothing and was sued, the defense
of usury would be good, even as against a holder in due course, who
could not collect on such a void instrument.
What is important is that, as the illustration of the note indicates,
there is nothing "on its face" to show its void nature. If the same
note in New, York were issued in payment of an illegal gambling
debt, 8 ' the illegality would be a good defense against a holder in due
course since the instrument, although it has no remarkable facial
defects, is void.
It is also clear that while UCC § 9-206'" validates the type of
waiver of defense clause involved in Bankers Trust, the statute works
only when the assignment is taken for value, in good faith, and without
notice of a claim or defense.'" The assignment remains subject to the
same defenses as may be asserted against a holder in due course of
an instrument under UCC Article 3."'
The statement that the word "nullity" in UCC S 3-305(2)(b) was
intended "to provide a defense against a holder in due course only
in cases where the obligation sued upon is void on its face," hence
seems unsupportable.
186. Id.
187. GEN. OBLIG. S 5-513.
188. See GEN. OBLIG. Title 4 and, e.g., GEN. OBLIG. S 5-413. As to the illegal
voidness of instruments issued for gambling purposes, see Hotel Riveria, Inc. v. First
National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma, 580 F. Supp. 122 (W.D. Okla. 1983);
Gulf Collateral, Inc. v. Morgan, 415 F. Supp. 318, 322 (S.D. Ga. 1976); National Recovery
Systems v. Mazzei, 123 Misc.2d 780, 475 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (a gambling debt
will not be enforced in New York unless it was valid where incurred). See also: Hen-
drix v. McKee, 281 Or. 123, 575 P.2d 134 (1977); Miller v. Radikopf, 394 Mich. 83, 228
N.W.2d 386 (1975) (agreement to split proceeds of winning Irish Sweepstakes ticket
enforced as non-offensive to public policy).
189. See supra text corresponding to note 93.
190. UCC S 9-206. United Counties Trust Co. v. Mac Lum, Inc., 643 F.2d 1140
(5th Cir. 1981) (assignee found to have had "notice" was subject to defense of failure
of consideration); First National Bank of New Jersey v. Reliance Elec. Co., 668 F.2d
725 (3d Cir. 1981) (assignee did not meet good faith and absence of notice requirements
and could not benefit from waiver of defense clause); Personal Finance Co. v. Meredith,
39 Ill. App. 3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (1976) (if plaintiff had actual notice of complaints
it would not have been holder in due course); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. Mark Ford,
Inc., 438 A.2d at 105, supra note 92 (assignment is subject to all defenses of a type
assertable against a holder in due course under UCC Article 3).
191. Laurel Bank, 438 A.2d at 705, supra note 92.
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COMMENT AS TO TIER 2. As to whether a bribery-induced con-
tract is truly void in New York in that it may not be ratified, the
Sirkin92 wording adverted to by the court is as follows:
• . . this is not a case in which the rule of ratification,
applicable to ordinary contracts induced by fraud, should
be applied. The public policy of our state forbids the ratifica-
tion, as well as the making of such a contract. Usually
private contracts concern only the parties thereto, and it
is optional with a person who has discovered that he has
been defrauded whether to ratify the contract or to rescind
it. There is ordinarily, at least, no general public policy
involved in such cases.'93
Sirkin is New York's classic commercial bribery case. It was a simple
action to recover some $1,500 for hosiery and wrappers sold to the
defendant, a Manhattan department store. The defense was that Sirkin
had paid a bribe to the store's purchasing agent; hence, the store
should not have to pay for the goods delivered and accepted under
the bribery-induced contract. The court found the defense sufficient.1"
The store was able to keep the goods without having to pay for them.
The moral was simple: One who commits commercial bribery forfeits
his right to collect on the business he bribed to get. The civil judg-
ment had a remarkable penalty; and there was no problem about
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Sirkin held the bribery-
induced contract illegally void because it was induced by the commis-
sion of a crime. (The Penal Law's first stated general purpose in New
York is to "proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably
causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public
interests. ' " )
A litmus test of voidness has to do with whether a given con-
tract may be ratified." Sirkin finds the bribery-induced contract may
192. See supra note 21.
193. Id. 124 App. Div. at 391, 108 N.Y.S. at 835.
194. The Sirkin dissent insists New York's then commercial bribery statute
(S 384r, text supra note 22) failed to set forth the contract was void (Bankers Trust
also so states); that it was voidable only, since it was a legal contract merely bribery-
induced (Bankers Trust also so states); and that (echoing the Gray dissent in Riggs)
the criminal statute fixed a penalty and the court may not impose additional punish-
ment for its violation. See 124 App. Div. at 395, 108 N.Y.S. at 838. Cf. N.Y. PENAL
LAW S 5.10(3).
195. See McConnell, supra note 28. The same general notion is seen in the New
York statute allowing one who receives unsolicited goods to treat them as an "uncondi-
tional gift." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW S 5-332(1).
196. See N.Y. PENAL LAW S .1.05(1).
197. See Bankers Trust at 599 F.2d 492.
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not be ratified because it involves criminal conduct. The general rule
is if the act done was a civil act, it may be ratified; "but no authority
is to be found that an act which is itself a criminal offense is capable
of ratification.""9 8 Ratification is a doctrine which applies when the
following four elements are present: (1) the principal is disclosed suf-
ficiently to be capable of later identification and (2) the agent acts
without or in excess of his authority and (3) the ratification is of the
entire act and not of a part and (4) the principal knows all the facts
of importance when he ratifies.1" Ratification is generally a contracts
and torts doctrine. 0
Although a forgery may be "ratified,"20' the Official Code Com-
mentators make clear that what is meant is "adopted" and, if that
is done, the word "ratified" is merely used to indicate the adoption
of retroactive. 02 They further caution that, "While the ratification may
be taken into account with other relevant facts in determining
punishments, it does not relieve the signer of criminal liability.120 3
Note that in forgery, by the forger's very act of passing off the
signature as the principal's, the forger purports to act as, and therefore
for, a principal; furthermore, ratification of the forgery is never forced,
but voluntary. One of the necessary elements of ratification is that
the agent purport to act for a principal. In the criminal bribery agree-
ment, the agent does not purport to act for the principal. As to this,
Corbin says "an agreement by two parties for the doing of acts that
both know to be a felony would have no legal operation and be 'void'
although the acts themselves, when performed, would have very
important legal effects indeed."' (If the resulting bribery-induced con-
tract is illegally void,s forcing a ratification down the throat of the
already victimized principal seems incongruous. If he cannot ratify
198. Brook v. Hook, L.R. 6 Ex. 89 (Exchequer 1871). Since one cannot commit
a crime by ratifying what is already done, the rule that subsequent ratification is
equivalent to prior authorization cannot be applied to criminal cases. Cook v. Com-
monwealth, 141 Ky. 439, 132 S.W. 1032 (1911).
199. A.L. SAINER, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF NEW YORK 6 (1972).
200. Id. at 7; W. SEAVEY AND L. HALL, CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 314 (1956).
201. UCC S 3-404. See also United States v. Davis, 125 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Ark.
1954) (making payments on a note which the makers denied they signed not deemed
a "ratification").
202. Official Comment 3 to UCC S 3-404.
203. Id.
204. I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 7 p. 16.
205. Sirkin, supra note 21; ". . . an agreement to divide the profits of a
fraudulent scheme, or to carry out some object, in itself not unlawful, by means of
an apparent trespass, breach of contract or breach of trust, is unlawful and void.
(POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS, 342; SALMOND & WINFIELD, CONTRACTS p. 145); Harrington v.
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voluntarily, passing the transaction to a holder in due course cannot
coerce ratification.)
Under the general doctrine of respondiat superior, a principal
has been held criminally liable for a slander committed when a
manager of its store accused a customer of stealing."8 One thus easily
discerns that the rule which prevents "ratification" of criminal acts
is founded not only on public policy considerations, but on a concern
for protecting a principal from being ensnared into liability for an
unauthorized criminal act.
There is also to be considered where a person harmed by the
crime has power to control whether prosecution for the crime shall
or shall not be brought. As Sirkin 7 had implied "Insofar as an act
constitutes a private wrong the injured individual is free to make a
settlement with the wrongdoer, or to forgive him entirely without
any reparation. But the general rule is that a private individual has
no power to ratify, settle or condone a public wrong even if it was
a wrong which injured his person or harmed his property."" 8 Any
ability he has to ratify would come only if there is a specific excep-
tion to the general rule and only in the exact manner provided by
that exception. 9 For example, in New York, the owner of property
cannot, by accepting complete restitution, forgive the crime of larceny
or embezzlement.21 A larceny victim may contract with the thief for
repayment of his loss, but not if the contract includes an express or
implied promise that the victim will refrain from initiating a criminal
prosecution: A person commits the crime of compounding a crime if
Victoria Graving Dock Co., 3 Q.B.D. 549.)" Reiner, supra note 116 at 260-261; emphasis
added.
206. Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 27 S.E.2d 283 (1943).
207. Supra note 21.
208. R. PERKINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 517-18
(1952).
209. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Heckman, 113 Pa. Super. 70, 172 Atl. 28 (1934).
Without the specific exception, a rape victim could not "ratify" the rape by forgiving
the act. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Slattery, 147 Mass. 423, 18 N.E. 399 (1888). It
was "even beyond the power of mother's love to wipe out the criminal guilt of a son
who maliciously burned her barn." Id., citing State v. Craig, 124 Kan. 340, 259 Pac.
802 (1927). Cf. People v. Gould, 70 Mich. 240, 38 N.W. 232 (1888) (prosecution for seduc-
tion by false promise of marriage discharged after parties' marriage).
210. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 215.45 (McKinney 1975). See also Breaker v. State, 103
Ohio St. 670, 134 N.E. 479 (1921); Fleener v. State, 58 Ark. 98, 23 S.W. 1 (1893). In
New York, it is an affirmative defense to the crime of compounding a crime that ac-
ceptance of restitution was in the reasonable belief that the amount was not in excess
of the amount due. Id. See, however, infra note 211.
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he agrees to accept any benefit upon an understanding that he will
refrain from initiating prosecution for a crime. 1 '
These, then, are some of the broad and complex concepts underly-
ing the statement in Sirkin that a bribery-induced contract may not
be ratified. If that statement is true, it would give the bribery-induced
contract what Bankers Trust calls "a characteristic of true voidness." '
One case not cited by Bankers Trust is Babcock v. Warner,"'
which squarely faced the question of whether a bribery-induced con-
tract may be ratified. The court held the contract was not capable
of such ratification as to enable one to recover under it. However,
this decision did not involve a holder in due course, and thus may
not have affected the last and most crucial step of the court's reason-
ing in Bankers Trust.
COMMENT AS TO TIER 3. The turning point of the Bankers Trust
holding occurs when the court stops examining the character of the
bribery-induced contract (after finding New York law holds such con-
tract to be void), and then turns away to examine the character of
the plaintiff. It is here the decision appears to run two different
reasons together, perhaps "even reasons of different types.2 1 4 A holder
in due course of an instrument issued for an illegal gambling debt,
or of a usurious instrument (even one not criminally usurious) in New
York is an innocent non-wrongdoer;215 yet he is precluded from
recovery precisely because these instruments are treated as illegally
void. A holder in due course for the same reason may not recover
if there was such fraud in the execution as to constitute a real defense
under UCC § 3-305."' In applying UCC S 3-305 to real defenses such
as illegal gambling, usury, or fraud in the execution, the policy of
New York has not at all been concerned with the preclusion of
wrongdoers from recovery. Holders in due course by definition are
not wrongdoers as to the instrument or obligation.
The Williston rules relied on by Bankers Trust"7 that "An inno-
cent plaintiff may recover on an illegal agreement which is not
211. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 215.45(1) (McKinney, 1975); Davis v. Mathews, 361 F.2d
899, 902 (1966).
212. 599 F.2d at 492.
213. Babcock v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 240 App. Div. 466, 270 N.Y.S. 765
(1934).
214. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of
Common-Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 715 (1978).
215. See, e.g., requirements of UCC SS 3-302, 3-303, 3-304, 3-201, 3-307(3) and
9-206(1).
216. See UCC S 3-305(2)(c) and Official Comment 7 to UCC S 3-305.
217. See supra note 36, Bankers Trust, 599 F.2d at 493, n.2.
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declared void by statute" '218 and that "a holder in due course may
recover on a negotiable instrument originally given as part of an illegal
transaction" '219 hardly dispose of the illegality complications under UCC
S 3-305. The holder in due course indeed may recover-if the illegality
is not such as to render the obligation void. But if the obligation is
void, he may not. Williston does not mandate anything to the con-
trary, and that is the only possible interpretation to be given his rules;
otherwise, the letter and philosophy of UCC S 3-305(2)(b) codifying
illegality as a real defense would itself be a nullity.
In denying recovery to holders in due course of illegally void
instruments, the New York courts refuse to validate void transac-
tions, notwithstanding the innocence of the party seeking their
enforcement. Sirkin"' is clear that the court would not lend its aid
to the "enforcement of this contract,"" stating:
The Legislature has not expressly declared either that the
contract to pay the bribe or the contract induced by the
bribe is void or unenforceable. A contract, however, made
in violation of a penal statute, although not expressly pro-
hibited or declared to be void, is prohibited, void, and unen-
forceable, whether executory or executed (Griffith v. Wells,
3 Denio, 226; Barton v. Port Jackson and N.T.P.R. Co., 17
Barb. 397).'
In order to focus on the voidness issue in Bankers Trust, it is
necessary to examine the transactions involved in that case, since
there were three different contracts which need to be separated out.
V. BRIBERY AND ITS THREE BASIC CONTRACTS
The three basic contracts involved in Bankers Trust are typical
of all commercial bribery contracts. They are as follows:
A. The Employment Contract: The contract between the
employer or principal and the bribe-receiver who is an employee,
agent, or fiduciary.' [In Bankers Trust this was the contract between
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Supra note 21.
221. 124 App. Div. at 388, 108 N.Y.S. at 834; emphasis added.
222. Id. See also State ex rel Bradford v. Cross, 38 Kan. 696, 17 P. 190 (1888)
(if the state could prove bribery at the trial, a contract for the sale of school lands
would be declared void and the state would not be required to return the bribe money).
223. N.Y. PENAL LAW SS 180.00, 180.03, 180.05 and 180.08 (McKinney 1975). The
employment contract in connection with bribery involving public servants would be
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Royal and Buquicchio and the other employees who were bribed. '4]
B. The Bribery Contract: The bribery agreement between the
bribe-receiver and briber,' made in breach of the fiduciary duty owed
under the Employment Contract. Its purpose is to obtain the Resulting
Contract. [In Bankers Trust this was the agreement between Regent
and the Royal employees, particularly Buquicchio. 6 ]
C. The Resulting Contract: The bribery-induced contract between
the principal and the briber or a third party.' [In Bankers Trust,
this was the lease entered into between Litton and Regent.22 8]
ANALYSIS
A. Under the Employment Contract, the employee, agent or
fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty and good faith to the employer or
principal. 2 9
B. The Bribery Contract itself is illegal and surely absolutely
void in New York. Whether the employer or principal is a public
the government instrumentality. See N.Y. PENAL LAW S 10(15) (McKinney 1975) defini-
tion of "public servant." See also S 200.40 as to "party officer," and SS 200.45, 200.50
as to bribe giving and bribe receiving for public office.
224. See 599 F.2d at 490.
225. Extortion is not per se denominated as a defense to commercial bribery,
as it is in the bribery of either public or labor officials. No cases have been found
involving the use of extortion, duress or coercion as a defense to a civil action involv-
ing bribery or commercial bribery. If coercion is employed by one of the parties,
however, such conduct would itself be criminal in New York. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
SS 135.60, 135.65, 135.70, 135.75 (McKinney 1975).
226. 599 F.2d at 490.
227. New York has held such contracts to be void. "An examination of the
language in the New York decisions on the enforceability of bribery-induced contracts
suggests that New York holds such contracts to be 'void.' Sturm v. Truby, 245 App.
Div. 357, 361, 282 N.Y.S. 433, 437 (4th Dept. 1935); Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store,
124 App. Div. 384, 393, 108 N.Y.S. 830, 837 (1st Dept. 1908), cited with approval in
McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 470, 166 N.E. 494, 497, 199
N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (1960); and Shemin v. A. Black & Co., 32 Misc.2d 1046, 225 N.Y.S.2d
805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1962), rev'd on procedural grounds, 39 Misc.2d 354, 240 N.Y.S.2d
622 (1st Dept. 1963)." Bankers Trust, 599 F.2d at 492.
228. 599 F.2d at 490.
229. Continental Management, supra note 18; Levy-Caen. supra note 1 at 107-09,
citing Rothschild v. Brookman, 2 Dow & Cl, 188 (1831); Pariente v. Lubbock, 20 Beav.
588 (1885); Andrew v. Ramsay, 2 K.B. 635 (1903). This is implicit in the agreement
between them, "since the undertaking is to advance the interests of the principal in
accordance with the principal's desires. It is not the agent's business that is carried
on, but that of the principal . . ." Seavey and Hall, supra note 200 at 3; see generally,
Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981);
Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982).
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institution or a private entity, both parties are engaging in criminal
conduct and are in pari delicto.1 There is no "victim" in this two-
party agreement; hence, there is no possibility of "ratification." Since
both parties' conduct is criminal and they are equally at fault, we
do not have a "voidable" contract such as one resulting from fraud
in the inducement, where the victim is allowed time to decide whether
he wishes to elect to ratify or rescind. Instead, we have a situation
like The Highwayman's case:"' two criminals engaged in an illegal
agreement, neither having a cause of action against the other for
breach of their void agreement.
If the characterizing of this Bribery Contract is not excessive,
assume a $10,000 check were issued by B, a bribe-giver payable to
the order of A, a bribe-receiver. Were this check negotiated to a holder
in due course who sued B, and B claimed such illegality of the instru-
ment as to render his obligation a nullity (the "real" defense of
illegality), this defense should be good. 2
No cases have been found on this point either in the United
States or, going as far back as 1945, in Great Britain. The holding
in Bankers Trust might be improperly misconstrued as authority for
230. Clark v. United States, 102 U.S. 322 (1880); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
S 598 (1932). Generally if a contract is illegal, neither party may recover on it and
the parties are left where they stand on the theory that the court will not grant aid
to either wrongdoer. Id.; Hedla v. McCool, 476 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973) (collecting
general illegality cases). One who bribes or attempts to bribe a judge or other public
official or agent is guilty of moral turpitude. See United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d
834 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. den. 309 U.S. 664 (1940); In re McNally, 252 App. Div. 550,
300 N.Y.S. 459 (1938) (attorney convicted of commercial bribery disbarred because acts
involved moral turpitude). Cf. Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970) (com-
plaint seeking return of jewelry deposited to secure illegal contingency fee agreement
in divorce case stated a valid claim); Liebman v. Rosenthal, 185 Misc. 837, 57 N.Y.S.2d
875, affid 269 App. Div. 1062, 59 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dept. 1945) (jewelry given in France
to one purporting to be a friend of Portuguese Consul to be used as bribe for visas
to help plaintiff and his family escape Nazis during World War II: complaint for return
of jewelry withstood motion for summary judgment, since plaintiff was defrauded, not
in pari delicto, and not guilty of moral turpitude); Aikman v. City of Wheeling, 120
W. Va. 46, 195 S.E. 667 (1938) (recovery allowed although restitution check proffered
on condition that payee suppress criminal prosecution). See also, generally, Gellhorn,
Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935).
231. See McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899) which refers to this as a
"real" case. Id. at 654.
232. Lord Mansfield cautions that this is true even though illegality "sounds
at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant." Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341,
343 (1775). Also a "person who is guilty of illegality or fraud, and knows that he can-
not sue himself, is likely to hand over the instrument to some other person to sue
for him." Bank of Cyprus, supra note 74.
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the proposition that bribery would be a personal and not a real defense
against the holder in due course of such an instrument. Bankers Trust
does not so hold and in any event should not be so construed.
The following examples are proffered to indicate why bribery
should be a "real" defense if an instrument is issued in payment of
the bribe, although it has passed to a holder in due course:
EXAMPLES
Dramatis Personae:
B: Briber
J: Dishonest Judge who agrees to accept bribe
A: Dishonest Agent who agrees to accept bribe
H: Holder, or possible Holder in Due Course
V: Victim of fraud in the inducement
1. B promises to pay Judge J $25,000 if J will decide a case to be
heard tomorrow in B's favor. J decides the case in B's favor, but never
receives the $25,000 and sues B for breach of contract. J cannot
recover if B pleads illegality. The parties are in pari delicto and the
agreement is illegally void.m
2. B pays J $25,000 cash in return for J's agreement to decide
a case to be heard tomorrow in B's favor. J accepts the money but
decides the case against B. B sues J for return of his money. B is
denied access to the courts and cannot recover.u
233. See supra notes 230-32.
234. Womack v. Maner, 227 Ark. 789, 301 S.W.2d 438 (1957) (no recovery of
bribe money paid to a county judge to prevent plaintiff from being punished for
gambling); Riggs v. Palmer, supra note 141; McConnell, supra note 28. Query as to
what effect a claim of extortion would have on the plaintiffs rights in such a case.
The Reviser's Notes to the Revision of the N.Y. PENAL LAW explain:
Even though the victim of an extortion, he [the briber] is still guilty of
bribery by virtue of conferring a benefit upon a public servant or a labor
official 'upon an agreement or understanding that' the latter's decision
or action will thereby be influenced' (N SS 180.15, 200.00). Out of obvious
equitable considerations, the new bill arbitrarily restores the coerced 'bribe
giver's' defense (N SS 180.20, 200.05).
Fourth Interim Report of the State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision
of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, Leg. Doc. (1965) No. 25 at 43. Extortion might
conceivably throw the case into a Liebman-type situation (see Liebman v. Rosenthal,
supra note 230) allowing recovery if plaintiff were not deemed guilty of moral tur-
pitude. See generally, N.Y. PENAL LAW SS 35.05 (McKinney 1975); William J. Davis, Inc.
v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412 (1970) (landlord under illegal lease deemed not guilty of moral
19851
Driscoll: Bribery as a "Real" Defense Against a Holder in Due Course
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
432 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
3. B pays J $25,000 cash in return for J's agreement to decide
a case to be heard in B's favor. J accepts the money and decides the
case in B's favor. B sues J to get his money back. B is denied access
to the courts and cannot recover.235
4. B gives J his personal check for $25,000 made payable at
Js request to the order of "Cash," in exchange for J's promise to
decide a case to be heard tomorrow in B's favor. An hour later, J
takes the check and gives it to H, in payment for a good used car.
H gives J the car. The check is dishonored. (B may have stopped pay-
ment because he has decided to abandon his crime; or he does not
trust J; or he just does not have that much money in his checking
account.) H sues B on the instrument. B pleads illegality as a defense.
Assuming H can prove his holder in due course status, B's defense
should nevertheless be good. The transaction, bribing a judge, is a
felony and void.2'
(a) If the defense is not good against a holder in due course: H
could recover from B on the instrument, leaving J with the car. The
dishonest judge will profit from his crime. If B sues J, he cannot as
a wrongdoer have access to the courts to get his money back." 7 As
between B and J, we have more of an interest in having the bite
of the law felt by J, who is in a position of public trust and who
may again be encouraged to accept bribes; but the result instead is
that B, the briber is forced to carry out a crime and to pay; and J,
the corrupt judge, keeps the benefit of his illegal bargain.
(b) If the defense is good against a holder in due course: H could
not collect from B if B pleads illegality as a defense. This would not
turpitude entitled to recover in quasi-contract); see also Aikman, supra note 230;
Singleton v. Foreman, supra note 230.
235. See supra note 234.
236. Id.
237. The obligation to pay a bribe to a judge cannot but be a nullity. The
original agreement was by two parties for doing of acts that both knew to be a felony
and would have no legal operation and be void. See text corresponding to supra note
204 ". . . no man may be permitted to profit from his own wrongdoing in a court
of justice." Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Terminal, 359 U.S. U.S. 231, 232 (1959); Stone v.
Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d 571 (1948); Womack v. Maner, supra note 234. Courts are
closed "to one who would prove his own wrongdoing as a basis for his supposed 'rights.'"
Carr v. Hoy, 2 N.Y. 2d 185 (1957h Sirkin, 108 N.Y.S. 830; McConnell, 7 N.Y. 2d 465; Reiner,
259 N.Y. 250; Riggs, 115 N.Y. 506; Holnan, 1 Cowp. 341; Certa v. Wittman, 35 Md. App.
364, 370 A.2d 573 (1977); Androws v. Coulter, 163 Wash. 429, 1 P.2d 320 (1931); Lanley
v. Devlin, 95 Wash. 171, 163 P. 395 (1917).
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leave H without remedy. He has two perfectly valid causes of action
against J:
[1] An action for goods sold and accepted in the amount of
$25,000;.38 and
[2] An action on the instrument for breach of warranty. 9 In this
case, J breached his warranty on transfer that there would be no
defense good against him. If B had a good defense of illegality, H
could collect the $25,000 from J for breach of this warranty. This result
leaves B not having to pay the bribe money and complete the crime,
and J, feeling the bite of the law, having to pay for his car with his
own money.
If, as is customary, H had asked for J's indorsement, albeit no
indorsement is necessary to transfer bearer paper.' J would have made
this warranty that there was no defense good against him to H and
any subsequent holder taking in good faith.2"' Even if J had given
a "without recourse" indorsement, H (and any subsequent holder
taking in good faith) 2 would still have a good breach of warranty
cause of action against J: the "without recourse" indorsement merely
narrows the no defense warranty. 3 to a warranty that J had "no
knowledge of' a defense good against him. In the example proffered,
J had actual knowledge of a defense good against him, having taken
the instrument in payment of a bribe, and would thereby be liable
for breach of this warranty.
5. Same facts as in 4, except that J has extorted14 the money
from B, who gave J the same $25,000 check made out to "Cash" at
J's behest. J uses it to pay for the car and, when the instrument
is dishonored for any of the reasons suggested in 4 above, H sues B.
(a) If the defense of bribery is not good against a holder in due
course: the victim of the extortion would have to pay H. J might keep
his car and profit from his crime. Although in New York extortion
is a defense to a criminal bribery charge involving a public servant
238. "Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underly-
ing obligation . . . the obligation is suspended .... If the instrument is dishonored
action may be maintained on either the instrument or the obligation . . ." UCC S 3-802.
239. "Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration war-
rants to his transferee" inter alia that "no defense of any party is good against him."
UCC S 3417(2)(d).
240. UCC S 3-202(1).
241. UCC S 3-417(2).
242. Id.
243. UCC S 3-417(3).
244. See supra note 234.
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or labor official, B's case against J is not clear cut. Equitably, he should
recover. But no case has been found holding B, as a briber, would
not be denied access to the courts and precluded from recovering
against H.
(b) If the defense of bribery is good against the holder in due
course: H can collect against J on either of his two causes of action
set forth in 4(b)[1] and [2] above.
6. Same facts as in 4, except that the bribe-taker is not a judge
but A, an employee who has accepted the $25,000 check made out
to "Cash" in exchange for his promise to have his employer give a
contract to B. A now goes to H and buys the same car, giving H
the check. B has second thoughts and stops payment, maybe because
he does not trust A, has decided to abandon his crime, or maybe
because he just does not have that much money in his checking ac-
count. In any event, the check is returned to H dishonored. H sues
B on the instrument.
(a) In states where commercial bribery under these cir-
cumstances is a felony,24 B's defense without doubt should be a real
defense against H. The defense should also be good in all other states
because (1) The instrument is issued in direct contravention of those
states' commercial bribery statutes and thus is criminal in nature.
The underlying obligation (to pay a bribe) must be regarded as void.
Both parties are guilty of moral turpitude and are in pari delicto.
Neither is capable of ratifying his void agreement or criminality; or
(2) The instrument is issued in direct contravention of those states'
other criminal statutes, or is a common law offense or repugnant
to the public policy of these states. This would again leave H with
his two good causes of action set forth in 4(b)[1] and [2] above against
A, the bribe-taker.
(b) If the illegality is not a good defense against H: B would have
to pay H and again A, the bribe-taker, profits from his crime or takes
advantage of his own wrong and keeps the car. (Should B sue A, he
would be denied access to the courts as a wrongdoer, since courts
will ordinarily not assist a briber to recover bribe money paid. 46 )
Contrast the following fraud in the inducement example:
7. Victim V gives A his personal check for $25,000 made payable
at A's request to the order of "Cash" in exchange for an emerald
ring which A has represented to be "worth over $30,000." A transfers
245. See, e.g., supra note 16.
246. Womack v. Maner, supra note 234.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/2
BRIBERY
the check to H in return for a good used car which H delivers to
A. V finds out from an appraiser that the ring is "a nice ring worth
about $500," and immediately stops payment on his check. H sues
V. V shows he has a defense of fraud in the inducement. H establishes
he is a holder in due course. V will have to pay H, since fraud in
the inducement is a personal defense. V's obligation to pay is voidable
only, not void. However, V has a good cause of action against A. He
is not denied access to the court because he is guilty of a crime, moral
turpitude, or is trying to profit from his own crime or take advan-
tage of his own wrong. As a victim of a fraud, in New York V is
entitled either to ratify or rescind the voidable contract and, to fraud
damages. 47 Thus, the wrongdoer is not left with the fruits of his
misdeed.248
In McConnell v. Commonwealth,249 had the alleged bribe to the
producer's agent been in the form of McConnell's $10,000 check even-
tually taken by a holder in due course, it is inconceivable to the writer
that New York courts would not have held bribery to be a real
defense, if McConnell had pleaded illegality in an action by the holder
in due course.2'5
Because the Uniform Commercial Code has built in warranties
on transfer and presentment,25 ' the instrument issued to pay a bribe
should be treated as truly void, coming from an illegally void,
unratifiable two-party agreement, with no redeeming features between
parties to a crime who are in pari delicto. Otherwise, for the first
time, bribe-takers could accept instruments and, by merely negotiating
to a holder in due course, the instrument would metamorphose into
a legal obligation to commit a crime and pay a bribe.
If bribery is treated as a real defense, the illegal Bribery Con-
tract is left to unwind, so that no money is paid out on it.
C. The Resulting Contract, of the type involved in Bankers Trust,
is more complex. It is, however, the raison d'ere of the Bribery Con-
tract. In that sense, it is also the corpus delicti of the criminal bribe.
The Resulting Contract is the bag of loot The Highwayman2 52 sought
247. See N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW S 3002(e).
248. The opposite result occurs if bribery is not a real defense. See supra
examples 4(a), 5(a), 6(b).
249. Supra note 28.
250. It is black letter law that one who has timely withdrawn from his wrongful
act stands clear. McConnell would have been allowed to say he turned back from his
wrongful intentions. If he so pleaded, the reason would not be important; the turning
back is paramount. See Aikman v. City of Wheeling, supra note 230.
251. UCC S 3-417.
252. See supra note 231.
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to have apportioned, or the body of the poisoned grandfather in Riggs
v. Palmer -the entity which will give the criminal the fruits of his
crime.
Like a check given in payment of a bribe, the Resulting Con-
tract is legal on its face. But under its gloss is a dough composed
of breach of fiduciary duty, corruption, crime, some larceny, conspiracy,
theft, betrayal, embezzlement, mendacity and "treason,"' held
together by the grease of the briber's lubrication payments and
droplets of fraud. Its flavor is different from a transaction resulting
from fraud in the inducement because of the existence of the Employ-
ment Contract. At the moment of making the criminal Bribery Con-
tract, there simultaneously occurs a breach of fiduciary duty under
the Employment Contract. Those two misdeeds then merge with the
briber's crime. The Resulting Contract is thus born with two bad genes
coming from the bribe-receiver, linked with the bad gene of the
briber's crime. Is it void or voidable? Sirkin said it was void; Bankers
Trust, voidable only, in the hands of a holder in due course.
Since a holder in due course, by definition, is a non-wrongdoer
as to the obligation or transaction, that cannot be a reason for treating
as voidable a bribery-induced contract which for over 75 years in New
York has been condemned as illegally void.
As Sirkin observed, quoting Chief Justice Marshall: "Where the
contract grows immediately out of, and is connected with, an illegal
253. Supra note 141.
254. See supra note 13.
255. See supra text corresponding to note 222. If it is void, how many void
contracts are there floating around which parties abide by? The validity of the con-
tract which McConnell allegedly bribed to get for Commonwealth was never questioned.
Query as to what would have happened if Universal, whose agent was bribed, breached
and pleaded the illegality.
In 1981, the McConnell case was invoked in a landlord's summary proceeding
for some $27,000 in unpaid rent under the lease of a Brooklyn warehouse. The tenant,
Prudential Lines, Inc., pleaded the landlord had bribed its vice-president and board
member to obtain the lease. It took the position, therefore, that although the lease
had four more years to run, it should not have to pay anything and should be per-
mitted to collect rents from its subtenant for the balance of the lease. The court
disagreed, stating (1) neither Sirkin nor McConnell required the wrongdoer without
compensation to provide goods or services in futuro; and (2) since the bribe-taker was
their own agent, the parties were in pari delicto. As to where this would leave the
parties, the court sidestepped. Prudential had adverted to pending actions it had com-
menced against the landlord in State and Federal courts. In view of the nature of
summary proceedings, the court found Prudential should pay its rent and be relegated
to having its commercial bribery problems resolved in the pending plenary actions.
McKeon v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 108 Misc.2d 873, 438 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct., Kings Co. 1981).
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or immoral act, a court of justice will not lend its aid to enforce it.
And if the contract be, in fact, one connected with the illegal transac-
tion, and growing immediately out of it, though it be, in fact, a new
contract, it is equally tainted by it."2 '
Under New York law, the bribery-induced contract has been held
and appears to be truly, not loosely, illegally void. If it cannot be
perceived as truly void, however, one might consider treating it like
an instrument which is fraudulently taken prior to issuance. The
"voidness" issue is thereby avoided. The defense in that case would
be that because the instrument or assignment was bribery-induced,
it was never voluntarily delivered or issued into commerce. Hence,
there cannot be a holder in due course. The same occurs where the
payee's signature on order paper is forged. There can be no holder,
and hence no holder in due course."7 This principle has not impeded
commerce; nor has the law that fraud in the execution or other illegally
void transactions2" may be asserted as real defenses against a holder
in due course.
Infancy, or such duress or incapacity as renders the obligation
a nullity, and discharge in insolvency proceedings are all real defenses
under UCC § 3-305.
Had Bankers Trust held bribery to be a real defense, the plain-
tiff banks would have had a good cause of action against their assignor
for breach of the implied warranty that the assignment was valid and
that there would be no defense which would impede their obtaining
a judgment on it.259
Much of the mystique surrounding the sacred rights of a holder
in due course has recently been dispelled. In consumer sales, even
prior to the Federal Trade Commission Act mandates26 the holder
in due course doctrine had ceded to the reality that consumer notes
256. 124 App. Div. 394, 108 N.Y.S. at 837.
257. "No party can ever be a holder of an order instrument stolen prior to
indorsement by the owner of the instrument." WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 42 at
459.
258. For example, in Alabama a contract to issue stock in exchange for a
promissory note was held truly void and it was found that "the illegality voids the
instrument, even in the hands of a holder in due course." General Beverages v. Rogers
216 F.2d 413, 417 (10th Cir. 1954).
259. See Friedman v. Schneider, 238 Mo. App. 778, 186 S.W.2d 204 (1945);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 2d S 333(2); Lonsdale v. Chesterfield, 99 Wash.2d 353, 662
P.2d 385 (1983).
260. Thereunder, contracts must carry a ten-point bold face notice that the
holder takes subject to the consumer's claims and defenses. See 16 C.F.R. S 433.2 (1976).
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ordinarily did not course through the long and fast streams of com-
merce. They rarely went beyond their first transferee. Institutions
like the plaintiffs in Bankers Trust which finance the purchase of non-
consumer goods likewise tend to be first and last transferees. Hence,
the overriding necessity for enveloping the holder in due course in
his traditional protective mantel does not exist to the same degree
under UCC § 9-206 as it does for negotiable instruments.
As one with the rights of an Article 3 holder in due course,
however, it seems clear that the UCC § 9-206 assignee remains sub-
ject to any real illegality defense under UCC S 3-305, whether or not
the assigned transaction is "void on its face."'"
CONCLUSION
Although a holder in due course may take a good title from a
chain which has a thief in its links, 2 the bearer instrument which
passed via a thief to the holder in due course in Miller v. Race" was
legally issued.' It is only such legally issued instruments which the
law need seek to protect. Instruments or agreements growing out
of such criminality as would render them void require condemnation
as a transaction-regardless of whether the plaintiff is a holder in
due course. That is the raison d'etre of the real illegality defense under
UCC § 3-305.
In Bankers Trust the court was invited not to aid illegality but
to condemn it.' 5 The court, however, sent its regrets. It may thus
have left the impression that in New York bribery is not as bad -
since it is not as illegally void-as usury or gambling, which are real
defenses. Yet usury is a real defense even in instances where the
amount charged does not attain the level of criminality; and gambling
run by the state is not illegal. Hence, they do not appear to be more
serious in nature than illegal commercial bribery.
From time to time, the legalization of capital punishment, and
of various crimes such as the sale of addicting drugs, prostitution,
pornography and adultery is discussed and considered. Usury and
gambling are included in those discussions. Bribery is not. It cannot
261. See Bankers Trust, 599 F.2d at 491; and supra text corresponding to notes
175-91.
262. See supra note 42.
263. See supra note 49.
264. See supra note 52. Contra UCC S 3-207(1)(c) as to illegal negotiation.
265. Selango United Rubber Estates, Ltd. v. Cradock, 2 All. E.R. 1073 (1968),
at text of decision corresponding to court's n.185.
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be legalized precisely because its essence is antithetical to structure.
It does to legal, commercial, or societal fiber what termites do to wood,
consuming and destroying from within.2 6 If bribery is to be deterred,
it is the decisions of civil courts which have great influence as a deter-
rent. Principals who are victimized by commercial bribery require,
especially in a UCC § 9-206 case, as much, if not more protection from
courts, as the holder in due course.
It may be true, as Bankers Trust opined, that its holding will
not have "an appreciable effect on the frequency of commercial
bribery." '67 One could also speculate that had the court seen fit to
hold the other way, such a decision might have had an appreciable
effect on reducing commercial bribery-how much of an effect is
impossible to guess, since all bribery arrangements are always made
and kept completely shrouded in secrecy.
266. A handbook written by an 18th Century Ottoman statesman observed:
"Bribery is the beginning and root of all illegality and tyranny, the source and foun-
tain of every sort of disturbance and sedition, the most vast of evils, and the greatest
of calamities. It is the mine of corruption than which there is nothing whatever more
calamitous... " JACOBY, NEHEMKIS AND EELLS, supra note 1, at 254 n.4; DRISCOLL, supra
note 1.
267. 599 F.2d at 493.
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